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ChinaThis study examines the relation between province-level ﬁnancial development
and the cost of equity in China. Our main ﬁndings are that (1) stock market
development reduces the cost of equity in general, but the eﬀect diminishes sig-
niﬁcantly in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and ﬁrms with high growth poten-
tial or innovation intensity and (2) banking development only marginally
lowers the cost of equity, but the eﬀect is stronger in non-SOEs. Further anal-
ysis reveals that stock market development substitutes for such institutional
factors as accounting quality, law enforcement, stock market integration and
the split-share structure reform in lowering the cost of equity. We also ﬁnd that
lack of banking competition and banking marketization and under-develop-
ment of the non-state economy partially account for the weak eﬀect of banking
development on the cost of equity.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
This study examines the impact of regional ﬁnancial development on the cost of equity capital in China,
using a large sample of Chinese ﬁrms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange (SZSE) over the period from 1998 to 2008. Speciﬁcally, following the approach of Jayaratne and
Strahan (1996) and Guiso et al. (2004a, 2004b), we investigate whether and how regional province-level ﬁnan-
cial development within the same country is associated with the cost of equity, and how the relation is
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regulations.
Over the past two decades, voluminous research has extensively examined the role of ﬁnancial development
in lowering economy-wide uncertainty and increasing economic performance and growth in a cross-country
setting.3 Nevertheless, previous research leaves still unresolved the question of whether and how ﬁnancial
development, as an independent institutional factor, aﬀects the cost of equity capital. This line of research sug-
gests that ﬁnancial development reduces the cost of equity through enhancing liquidity provision (Levine,
2005), improving risk diversiﬁcation (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; King and Levine, 1993b) and constraining
agency costs and information asymmetry (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). However, the relation between ﬁnan-
cial development and the cost of equity could be endogenous because both are likely to be aﬀected by common
institutional infrastructures such as legal enforcement, disclosure regulation or security regulations. For exam-
ple, La Porta et al. (1997, 2002a) show that a country’s legal institution is a key determinant of its ﬁnancial
market development and Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Brown et al. (2013) associate ﬁnancial disclosure reg-
ulation with ﬁnancial development. The cost of equity is shown to be associated with institutional factors such
as security regulations (Hail and Leuz, 2006), accounting disclosure requirements (Bushman and Smith, 2001;
Bushman et al., 2004) and insider trading regulations (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002).
Previous research also has paid relatively little attention to the impact of ﬁnancial development on a ﬁrm’s
cost of equity in transitional economies and emerging capital markets, wherein certain unique characteristics
of their banking sector and stock markets, including state or government interventions in ﬁnancial markets
may shape the relation in a diﬀerent way. For instance, in China, the stock market is characterized by a gov-
ernment-controlled listing process and the dominance of state-owned and politically-connected ﬁrms with
preferential bank lending (Aharony et al., 2000; Li et al., 2008; Hung et al., 2012).4 Existing evidence suggests
that ﬁnancial development under this backdrop can increase the cost of capital. Particularly, using a cross-
country sample, Jain et al. (2012) ﬁnd that state ownership increases the cost of equity. Their ﬁnding suggests
that in transitional economies like China where the stock market consists mainly of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), stock market development can possibly increase shareholders’ investment risk and thus the cost of
equity. David (2008) shows that stock market development, coupled with short-sale constraints, engenders
a high level of liquidity and investor heterogeneity, thereby resulting in excessive speculative activities. The
banking sector in China is characterized by a lack of competition, and dominance of state-owned banks, lend-
ing discrimination against non-SOEs and lending preference to SOEs. In this setting, banking development
can possibly deteriorate capital allocation eﬃciency (Wurgler, 2000; Dinc¸, 2005; Wiwattanakantang et al.,
2006; Claessens et al., 2008) and bank monitoring eﬃciency (La Porta et al., 2002b; Chen et al., 2011a).
Combined, an important implication from the above discussion is that ﬁnancial development may not nec-
essarily decrease the cost of equity, and it may increase the cost of equity in certain scenarios. Therefore, the
direction of the relation between the two is, in general, an open empirical question. Examining this issue in the
Chinese setting is interesting and important for the following reasons. First, it helps us gain additional insights
into whether and how stock market and banking development determine the cost of equity, and how their
eﬀects in emerging and transitional economies like China diﬀer systematically from those predicted in devel-
oped economies. Second, China is the largest transitional economy in the world and its continuous and rapid
ﬁnancial development since the 1980s represents features of an emerging market in general and also exhibits
unique Chinese characteristics. The richness of the common and unique features of China’s ﬁnancial3 For example, King and Levine (1993a), Levine (1997), Levine and Zervos (1998), and Beck and Levine (2002) examine relations
between ﬁnancial development and economic growth in a cross-country setting; Raddatz (2006) examines relations between ﬁnancial
development and uncertainty in economic growth in a cross-country setting. A notable exception is Guiso et al. (2004b) and Hasan et al.
(2009) in that both studies examine the relation in a single country setting of Italy and China, respectively. The consensus of these studies is
that ﬁnancial development accelerates economic growth and/or reduces its uncertainty by providing better ﬁnancial services such as more
eﬃcient liquidity provision, better risk diversiﬁcation and reduced information, agency and transaction costs.
4 For example, in China, overseas listing regulation requires approval from various government agencies such as ministries in central and
provincial governments and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Hung et al. (2012) report that SOEs with strong
political connections are more likely to be approved to list overseas, but their post-listing performance is worse, suggesting that their
approval is driven by political motivation or private beneﬁts and may not lead to eﬃcient capital allocation.
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between regional (province-level) ﬁnancial development and the cost of equity in a single country setting.
Third, a single country setting does not suﬀer from the confounding eﬀects caused by other institutional
and country-level factors in cross-country studies which are diﬃcult to control for. As prior research shows,
ﬁnancial development in a country is shaped by the legal and regulatory considerations at the country level,
such as corporate and security laws, bankruptcy laws and accounting rules, which may contaminate its asso-
ciation with the cost of equity in a cross-country setting. However, this is not a concern in a single country
setting because regional ﬁnancial development in each province is shaped by the same nation-wide legal
and regulatory considerations. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, data on province-level institutional
characteristics are publicly available only in China. These data availability enable us to assess the moderating
eﬀect of institutional infrastructures on the within-country relation between regional ﬁnancial development
and the cost of equity.5
Finally, our evidence from a cross-province study can be generalized to cross-country research because
provincial ﬁnancial markets are segmented and mimic national ones. Provincial ﬁnancial markets in China
are normally geographically fragmented due to the informational advantages and monitoring eﬃciency asso-
ciated with geographical proximity. They also share home bias and market segmentation similar to those in
the U.S. and international settings.6 For example, local investors have trading behaviors that diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly from those of other investors in China (Lei and Seasholes, 2004) and provincial branches of large banks
are usually headquartered in the capital city or other large cities of a province. In addition, the level of inte-
gration of provincial and national ﬁnancial markets represents an upper bound for the integration of national
and international markets.
Our empirical strategy involves measurement of ﬁnancial development and the cost of equity. To empiri-
cally measure ﬁnancial development, we consider both stock market and banking development. Speciﬁcally,
we measure stock market development as the ratio of market capitalization or market liquidity to GDP at the
province level, and banking development as the ratio of total bank loans to GDP in a province. As many listed
ﬁrms in China experienced relatively high growth opportunities during our sample period of 1998–2008, the ex
post realized return is unlikely to capture the real underlying cost of equity. We therefore employ the ex ante
expected cost of equity implied by market prices and earnings expectations to measure the cost of equity.
Our main results are summarized as follows. First, the cost of equity decreases with stock market develop-
ment, consistent with the well-documented eﬀect of stock market development mitigating economy-wide
uncertainty. We ﬁnd, however, that this eﬀect is less pronounced in ﬁrms with higher growth or more intensive
innovation. This ﬁnding suggests that the government-controlled listing process in China fails to provide suf-
ﬁcient equity ﬁnancing to these ﬁrms. Second, banking development is weakly and negatively associated with
the cost of equity, consistent with the notion that the lack of banking competition and state-ownership of large
banks decreases banking eﬃciency. The association diminishes in ﬁrms with higher growth or more intensive
innovation, consistent with ﬁndings in prior cross-country studies (Brown et al., 2013; Hsu et al., 2014) that
banking development generally does not support ﬁrm growth and innovation. Third, stock market and bank-
ing development have virtually no impact on the cost of equity for SOEs, while they have a signiﬁcant impact
on reducing the cost of equity for non-SOEs. This ﬁnding suggests that government intervention in SOEs
adversely aﬀects the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial development.
We next examine the moderating eﬀects on the negative relation between stock market development and the
cost of equity of institutional factors such as earnings quality, law enforcement, stock market integration and
the split-share structure reform. We ﬁnd that the negative relation is stronger in regions with lower earnings
quality and/or weaker law enforcement, implying that stock market development substitutes for these5 For example, Fan et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive database on the marketization index and sub-indexes that proxy for the
institutional development in a province or provincial municipal city in China from 1998 to 2010. These measures cover the following
aspects of marketization: the relation between the government and market, the development of non-state sectors, product market and
factor market in the economy and the development of market intermediary and the legal environment.
6 Petersen and Rajan (2002) ﬁnd that the U.S. banks rely heavily on local deposits and lend in their business, and Garcı´a-Herrero and
Vazquez (2007) report substantial home bias in the international allocation of bank assets. Refer to Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005),
Pirinsky and Wang (2006) and Lee (2011) for home bias and state-level market segmentation in the U.S. stock market.
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regions with high market integration and in the period subsequent to the share-issue structure reform in 2005.
The evidence supports the notion that by providing more investment freedom and risk-sharing beneﬁts, the
cost of capital eﬀect of stock market development substitutes for those of stock market integration and the
split-share structure reform. The above ﬁndings, taken together, suggest that stock market development sub-
stitutes for various institutional factors in lowering the cost of equity.
Then we explore how banking development characteristics and related institutional factors account for the
weaker eﬀect of banking development on reducing the cost of equity. We ﬁnd that the cost of equity eﬀect of
banking development is weaker in regions with low banking competition, low banking distribution eﬃciency
and a low degree of development of the non-state economy. Finally, our baseline results are robust to control-
ling for the moderating eﬀects of institutional factors, potential endogeneity with respect to stock market
development and banking development, and the use of alternative proxies for stock market development,
banking development and the cost of equity. Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that stock market development
is an independent institutional infrastructure that aﬀects the cost of equity.
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, it extends research on the rela-
tion between institutional and legal factors and the cost of equity. Prior studies show that the cost of equity is
inversely associated with a number of institutional factors, including enforcement of insider trading regula-
tions (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002), accounting disclosure rules, security regulations and cross-listing
(Hail and Leuz, 2006, 2009), and eﬀective corporate governance (Chen et al., 2009, 2011b). In contrast,
Ben-Nasr et al. (2012) and Jain et al. (2012) show that the cost of equity increases in government ownership.
Complementing these studies, we provide original evidence that stock market development is another indepen-
dent institutional infrastructure that lowers the cost of equity, but its eﬀect is discounted for SOEs relative to
non-SOEs.
Our study is also closely related to recent research on ﬁnancial development and innovation. In a cross-
country setting, Brown et al. (2013) and Hsu et al. (2014) report that stock market development increases
long-run growth in research and development (R&D) investment and innovation, particularly for small ﬁrms,
whereas credit market development has little impact on its growth. Our ﬁnding that the inverse relation
between regional stock market development and the cost of equity is weaker for growing and innovative ﬁrms
in China provides counterevidence to that of Brown et al. (2013) and Hsu et al. (2014), and points to a weak-
ness of the stock market development in China.
In addition, our study advances research on the interaction between stock market development and insti-
tutional factors in aﬀecting the cost of equity, for which prior studies report both a substitutive and a com-
plementary relation. Speciﬁcally, Ball (2001) argues that accounting infrastructure complements the overall
economic, legal and political infrastructures in forming a disclosure system that aﬀects the cost of equity.
In contrast, Hail and Leuz (2009) show that strengthened investor protection via U.S. cross-listing substitutes
for home country legal protection in decreasing equity costs. Chen et al. (2009) also report that national legal
protection substitutes for ﬁrm-level governance. Extending these studies, we show that stock market develop-
ment substitutes for accounting quality, legal enforcement, market integration and the national split-share
structure reform in lowering the cost of equity.
Moreover, our study is relevant to the literature on ﬁnancial development in China. Allen et al. (2005) show
that ﬁnance is not the key driver for economic growth in China; Guariglia and Poncet (2008) and Chang et al.
(2010) also ﬁnd that banking development is not either. 7 In contrast, Hasan et al. (2009) document that stock
market development does facilitate economic growth in China. Extending these studies, we ﬁnd that banking
development weakly decreases the cost of equity, while this cost-decreasing eﬀect is signiﬁcant for stock mar-
ket development. Our result that the lack of banking competition accounts for the weak eﬀect of banking
development on lowering the cost of equity is also consistent with prior evidence about the negative features
of the banking sector in China (e.g., Lin et al., 2012).7 Guariglia and Poncet (2008) and Chang et al. (2010) report that banking development decreases or is unrelated to economic growth in
China, respectively.
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economies. The banking system in China has been undergoing a series of regulatory reforms since the 1990s,
but their eﬀectiveness is controversial (Ho, 2012).8 Our result about the weak equity cost eﬀect of banking
development shows the necessity and urgency of deepening the ongoing banking reforms and suggests that
alleviating lending discrimination against non-SOEs, improving banking competition and developing the
non-state economy may be possible reform avenues. The ﬁndings about the abated eﬀect of stock market
development on lowering the cost of equity in SOEs, innovation-intensive ﬁrms, and/or ﬁrms with high
growth potential highlight the importance of reforming the IPO regulations to oﬀer a level-playing ﬁeld to
these ﬁrms.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the institutional
background. Section 3 develops relevant theories. Section 4 describes the research design. Section 5 reports the
main results. Section 6 conducts further analysis. Section 7 performs robustness checks. The ﬁnal section,
Section 8, concludes the paper.2. Institutional background
The ﬁnancial system in China includes a fast growing equity market and a large state-controlled banking
sector. The equity market consists of two stock exchanges SHSE and SZSE, and it is the largest stock market
among emerging economies in terms of the ratio of market capitalization to GDP (Allen et al., 2012). Since its
establishment in 1990, the stock market in China has been growing rapidly and plays an increasingly signiﬁcant
role in the Chinese economy and the world economy.9 Despite its enormous size and rapid growth, the stock
market in China has some downside characteristics that constrain its capital allocation role. One of the most
ominous is that the listing process favors SOEs and private ﬁrms with political connections. China’s stock mar-
kets were initially used as a vehicle for privatizing SOEs rather than raising capital for ﬁrms with growth oppor-
tunities (Ayyagari et al., 2010). Since the establishment of the stock markets, there has been a split-share
structure in listed SOEs—approximately two-thirds of shares owned by the state and legal persons were not
tradable. 10 This predominance of non-tradable shares in listed SOEs constrains risk-sharing and stock liquid-
ity, and posed a major problem in the Chinese stock market. In April 2005, CSRC initiated the split-share struc-
ture reform to convert all non-tradable shares into tradable shares, and most listed SOEs were required to
complete the reform by the end of 2007. In spite of improvement over time, the listing process still favors
SOEs, particularly those in strategic industries and in regions with stronger local political connections (Li
et al., 2008). Under such circumstances, the stock market development in China implies that more equity fund-
ing resources go to SOEs; therefore, it may not lead to an overall reduction of systematic risk and improvement
of capital allocation in the economy. In addition, the Chinese stock market also features excess speculation and
high turnover, mainly driven by retail investors (Bailey et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2012). As of the end of 2008, the
annual stock turnover ratios in SHSE and SZSE have reached 392.52% and 469.11%, respectively.
The banking system in China is much larger than its equity market and Chinese ﬁrms rely heavily on bank
loans for their external ﬁnancing needs. The banking sector has experienced rapid growth and consistent
reforms since 1980. It was initially dominated by the big four state-owned banks, but the number of collective,
private and foreign banks continues to grow. 11 However, the big four state-owned banks still dominate the8 These reforms in the 1990s include, for example, separating policy banks from commercial banks, transforming urban credit
cooperatives into commercial banks, granting limited licenses to foreign banks and non-state banks, and introducing standard accounting
and prudential norms. More reforms were implemented after China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002, such as
liberalizing interest rates, increasing operational freedom and partially privatizing state-owned banks.
9 By the end of 2008, the equity market in China is the fourth largest in the world, with 1625 stocks listed on the two stock exchanges; it
has total market capitalization of RMB 12136.6 billion, accounting for 40.37% of GDP in China (China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC), 2008).
10 A legal person is deﬁned as “an organization that has capacity for civil rights and capacity for civil conduct and independently enjoys
civil rights and assumes civil obligations in accordance with the law.” (The General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of
China, 1986, Chapter III).
11 The four largest banks in China are Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China (ICBC) and People’s Construction Bank of China (CBC).
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discriminating against other non-SOEs such as small town and village enterprises and other private ﬁrms
(Brandt and Zhu, 2000; Chang et al., 2010; Lu et al., 2012).12 State-owned banks are the least eﬃcient in per-
forming banking functions, while foreign banks are the most (Berger et al., 2009). Government intervention
over lending and other banking services still remains, although this intervention is decreasing over time (Ho,
2012). The banking sector also lacks competition despite continuous banking reforms such as improving bank
governance, partially privatizing state-owned banks and bringing in strategic foreign investors. Lin et al.
(2012) report that by the end of 2009, the big four banks have market share of 52.1% and 46.5% in terms
of deposits and loans, respectively.
3. Theoretical framework
3.1. Stock market development and the cost of equity
Stock market development generally lowers the cost of equity by improving liquidity provision, informa-
tion production, risk diversiﬁcation and external monitoring. First, stock market development increases
liquidity provision and decreases liquidity shocks for ﬁrms that rely on external ﬁnancing and/or have high
liquidity needs (Aghion et al., 2004; Levine, 2005; Raddatz, 2006; Hasan et al., 2009), and thus improves cap-
ital allocation eﬃciency in the economy (Wurgler, 2000). Recent studies of Brown et al. (2013) and Hsu et al.
(2014) report that stock market development supports technical innovations and long-run R&D investment,
primarily for small ﬁrms that rely more on equity ﬁnancing. High liquidity, capital allocation eﬃciency and
advanced technology decrease investment risk, and consequently, investors demand a lower required rate
of return for providing capital.
Second, with the development of the stock market, market participants face more intense competition and
have stronger incentives to seek private information and trade on it (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1984;
Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). This helps lower information asymmetry between informed and uninformed
investors (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992, 1994; Foster and Viswanathan, 1993), alleviate adverse selection
problems and ultimately reduce the cost of equity. 13
Third, stock market development expands the investor base and improves market liquidity. This facilitates
cross-sectional risk diversiﬁcation and inter-temporal risk-sharing, which in turn reduces the cost of equity.
Idiosyncratic risk is not easily diversiﬁable and usually priced in reality (Merton, 1987; Ang et al., 2010;
Malkiel and Xu, 2006). However, the improved risk diversiﬁcation and risk-sharing in a more developed stock
market help investors better diversify idiosyncratic risk, which in turn lowers the cost of equity.
Fourth, stock market development improves external monitoring over invested ﬁrms, which alleviates stan-
dard agency problems, and thus, lowers the cost of equity. It also facilitates the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information into stock prices; as a result, previously disadvantaged outside investors are now better informed,
have stronger monitoring capability and are exposed to less agency problems (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1982;
Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Moreover, ﬁnancial development also encourages information search by sophis-
ticated investors and facilitates their external monitoring. Enhanced external monitoring better curbs manage-
rial opportunism and lowers agency costs, and ultimately, the cost of equity decreases (Healy and Palepu,
2001; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006).14 The above discussions, taken together, suggest that stock market devel-
opment is inversely associated with the cost of equity.12 For example, Lu et al. (2012) suggest that Chinese non-SOEs can reduce lending discrimination through holding bank ownership and
then they enjoy beneﬁts of lower interest expense and better lending terms.
13 Armstrong et al. (2010) and Akins et al. (2012) argue that information asymmetry increases the cost of equity and that this eﬀect is
magniﬁed in illiquid and imperfect markets, suggesting that stock market development mitigates the adverse cost of capital eﬀect of
information asymmetry.
14 Bhide (1993) posits a contrasting view that higher liquidity, which is associated with the more developed U.S. stock markets, reduces
institutional investors’ and other investors’ monitoring incentives, because it is cheaper and easier to sell shares of poorly-performing ﬁrms.
This argument implies that stock market development may increase the cost of equity. However, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) suggest
that this is not a concern since institutional investors decrease the cost of equity through undertaking careful corporate governance and
reducing agency cost.
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may increase the cost of equity. First, the initial objective of stock market development in China was not to
improve capital allocation eﬃciency but to facilitate external ﬁnancing to SOEs and politically-connected
ﬁrms. Hence, unlike most developed stock markets around the world, the Chinese stock market may not pro-
vide suﬃcient funding to growing or innovative ﬁrms which are the drivers of economic growth. Second, the
Chinese stock market has fewer institutional investors and ﬁnancial analysts compared with more mature
stock markets, and is dominated by individual investors who lack privileged access to inside information
and often exhibit irrational trading behavior (Eccher and Healy, 2000; Yeh and Lee, 2000). Accordingly,
the stock market development in China may play only a limited role in facilitating the incorporation of private
information into stock prices, reducing information asymmetries or enhancing external monitoring. Lastly,
the Chinese stock market is also characterized by high turnover and excessive speculation driven by retail
investors (Bailey et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2012). Both features discourage investors from relying on fundamen-
tals. In addition, external monitoring is weakened because transient investors have no incentives and power to
monitor management closely (Xu and Wang, 1999).15 Combined, the stock market development in China may
not necessarily enhance, or may even possibly deteriorate, the eﬃciency in economy-wide capital allocation
and external monitoring. This may in turn increase systematic risk, and thus, the cost of equity.
The above reasoning from both sides suggests that stock market development is a key factor in inﬂuencing
the cost of equity. However, whether it decreases or increases the cost of capital in such an emerging stock
market as China cannot be directly inferred from existing studies. In addition, the trade-oﬀ between the pos-
itive and negative impacts of stock market development may diﬀer between SOEs and non-SOEs. Government
ownership in SOEs brings about government interference and expropriation, and increases the cost of equity,
as shown by Ben-Nasr et al. (2012) in a cross-country setting. In addition, SOEs in China may not use equity
ﬁnancing eﬃciently to maximize shareholder value even though they are favorably treated in the IPO process
and have better equity funding with stock market development. In contrast, non-SOEs, though they are dis-
advantaged in the equity ﬁnancing process, tend to make more eﬃcient use of the funding and liquidity asso-
ciated with stock market development.3.2. Banking development and the cost of equity
Banking development in general is expected to decrease the cost of equity for several reasons. First, banks
play an important role in providing liquidity and external funding to borrower ﬁrms, and higher ﬁrm liquidity
generally lowers economy-wide systematic risk (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In addition, ﬁnancial develop-
ment, particularly banking development in developing economies, allows better inter-temporal risk-sharing
and mitigates stock return volatility (Allen and Gale, 1995). Further, banking development facilitates private
information production because banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries (e.g., credit rating agencies) are
information producers and processors for borrower ﬁrms (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984). Given that
information production involves large ﬁxed costs, banking development improves the economies of scale
and lowers the production cost (Diamond, 1984; Veldkamp, 2006). Lastly, with privileged access to borrowers’
inside information, banks are better able to monitor borrower ﬁrms at a low cost (Diamond, 1984; Fama,
1984). Banking development strengthens a bank’s external monitoring over its borrowers, thereby mitigating
potential moral hazard and adverse selection problems associated with the information asymmetry between
potential borrowers and outside capital suppliers. The above reasoning suggests that banking development
mitigates economy-wide systematic risk and reduces the cost of equity capital.
However, some unique features of the banking sector in China weaken the potential mitigating eﬀect of
banking development on the cost of equity. First, the big four state-owned banks in China have dominant
market share in the banking sector and one of their primary goals is to support SOEs and politically-con-
nected ﬁrms (Brandt and Zhu, 2000; Chang et al., 2010). Accordingly, their focus is not on traditional banking
functions such as liquidity provision, information production, capital allocation, risk-sharing and external15 Xu and Wang (1999) provide anecdotal evidence that the eﬀective turnover ratio in the Chinese stock market ranges from 700% to
1000%.
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lending decisions depend primarily on political motives rather than on the borrowers’ credit quality (Cull and
Xu, 2005; Cull et al., 2009). A variety of government interventions, such as credit and interest rate controls,
state guarantees and government-directed lending policies, grant further lending privileges to SOEs.
Meanwhile, they also exacerbate lending discrimination against other non-SOEs such as small town and vil-
lage enterprises and private ﬁrms.
Second, state-owned banks do not have a strong motivation to produce ﬁrm-speciﬁc information and mon-
itor borrower ﬁrms because they cannot force SOEs to repay their loans without causing political problems
(Chang et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011a). This weakness could lead to an economy-wide unfavorable eﬀect
and increase systematic risk especially for SOEs. Third, the historical market segmentation and government
interference in the Chinese banking sector deter banking competition. Insuﬃcient competition also deterio-
rates banking eﬃciency in allocating capital (Lin et al., 2012), which has an economy-wide eﬀect and increases
systematic risk. 16 Since banking development without structural reform does not alleviate and even worsens
these inherent problems, it may not bring about an overall improvement of bank functionality to generate
beneﬁcial economy-wide eﬀects and decrease the cost of equity.
Therefore, the eﬀect of banking development on the cost of equity depends on the trade-oﬀ between the
positive and negative sides of banking development in China. This trade-oﬀ may diﬀer between SOEs and
non-SOEs. Due to government interference and expropriation, SOEs in China do not utilize their privileged
loan ﬁnancing eﬃciently for shareholder value maximization, even though their privileged loan ﬁnancing
increases with banking development. In contrast, non-SOEs are more sensitive to, and thus more eﬃciently
use increased funding associated with banking development, which alleviates lending discrimination against
them to a certain extent.4. Research design
4.1. Data and sample
Our accounting and stock market data are collected from the China Securities Markets and Accounting
Research (CSMAR) database, and ﬁrm ownership data from the China Center for Economic Research
(CCER) database. We obtain most measures for institutional factors from a database on province-level insti-
tutional development in China developed by Fan et al. (2011). We start with a sample of listed ﬁrms on SHSE
and SZSE for the period of 1998–2011 to retrieve ﬁrm-level stock market and accounting data to compute
measures of ex ante cost of equity capital, stock market development and banking development. However,
calculating the ex ante cost of equity capital measures requires at least three-year-ahead earnings’ data, and
therefore, our ﬁnal sample spans the period from 1998 to 2008. We also eliminate ﬁrm-years with missing data
for control variables. We winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distributions
to mitigate the impact of outliers. Following Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009), we do not exclude ﬁrms in the ﬁnan-
cial and utility industries. Our ﬁnal sample consists of 10,321 ﬁrm-years for 1281 non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial
ﬁrms listed on SHSE and SZSE from 1998 to 2008.4.2. Implied cost of equity capital measures
We use the ex ante implied cost of capital to measure the cost of equity capital. Both the ex ante implied
cost of capital and the ex post realized stock return are two widely used cost of capital measures. Compared
with the ex ante measure, the ex post measure is noisier and incurs non-trivial estimation errors because it also16 Speciﬁcally, the four state-owned banks have their own specialization in a designated sector of the economy, and the central bank’s
strict control over interest rates for deposits and loans prohibits price-based competition (Wong and Wong, 2001). The main responsibility
of ABC was to receive deposits in rural areas and extend loans to agricultural production projects and township industries. The CBC
focused on appropriating funds for capital construction from the state budget through the Ministry of Finance. The BOC focused on
deposits and loans for foreign exchange and international transactions, and the ICBC focused on the ﬁnancing of commercial and
industrial activities in urban areas.
J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 243–277 251captures shocks to a ﬁrm’s growth opportunities (Stulz, 1999) and incorporates diﬀerences in expected
growth rates (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Hail and Leuz, 2006).17 This weakness is especially severe in
China’s stock market where many listed ﬁrms are at the growth stage, shocks to a ﬁrm’s growth opportunities
are frequent and the growth rates of expected future cash ﬂow vary substantially across investors. In contrast,
the ex ante cost of equity measure is free from these problems because its valuation models explicitly control
for both future cash ﬂows and growth potential in the estimating process (Hail and Leuz, 2006, 2009).
Therefore, the ex ante measure is more appropriate in capturing the underlying cost of equity for listed ﬁrms
in China.
Following Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009) and Ben-Nasr et al. (2012), we adopt four implied cost of equity mea-
sures derived by the estimation methods proposed by Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (GLS, 2001), Botosan
and Plumlee (DIV, 2002), Easton (price-earnings-growth (PEG), 2004), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth
(OJN, 2005), denoted by RGLS, RDIV, RPEG, and ROJN, respectively. Diﬀerent from the case in the U.S. setting,
the analyst forecast data in China are unavailable for the majority of our sample years (1998–2004). We thus
follow Chen et al. (2011a) and use realized one-year-ahead earnings to substitute expected future earnings for
all model estimations. Although realized earnings have high volatility and add noise to our estimation to some
degree, they do not systematically inﬂate the cost of capital estimation as do analysts’ earnings forecasts in the
U.S. setting. 18 Among the four measures RGLS, RDIV, RPEG and ROJN, we use RGLS in most of our empirical
analysis because prior studies consider it the best measure in China’s capital market (Chen et al., 2011a). RDIV
is possibly subject to estimation error because Chinese listed ﬁrms do not often distribute dividends. RPEG and
ROJN require positive EPS growth and apply to only a non-representative small subsample with consistent
earnings growth, which may cause severe selection bias. For example, only 4509 and 3953 out of 10,321 obser-
vations in our ﬁnal sample have RPEG and ROJN values, respectively. Although RPEG is a preferable measure in
the U.S. setting (Botosan and Plumlee, 2005), it is not the best one in China. Therefore, we employ RGLS as
our main measure rather than using the average of all implied cost of equity measures which is often used in
the U.S. or other international studies. A description of the detailed procedures for estimating RGLS, RDIV,
RPEG and ROJN is summarized in Appendix B.4.3. Financial development measures
In our main tests, we use stock market and banking development to proxy for ﬁnancial development.
Following the conventional literature (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996; Wurgler, 2000), we adopt both
value-based and liquidity-based measures for stock market development, that is: (i) the ratio of total market
value of all shares listed on SHSE and SZSE at the end of a year to GDP in the same year, denoted by
MKTCAP and (ii) the ratio of the total market value of all shares traded in a year to GDP in the same year,
denoted by MKTLIQ. We also use the average of MKTCAP and MKTLIQ, denoted by FINAVG as an alter-
native measure. Following Wurgler (2000) and other ﬁnancial development studies, we measure banking
development as the ratio of annual total bank loans to GDP, denoted by CREDIT. We calculate these mea-
sures for each province or a province-level municipality where banks and listed ﬁrms are headquartered at the
ﬁscal year end (Hasan et al., 2009; Ayyagari et al., 2010). Appendix C reports the mean values of these stock
market and banking development measures by year and by province.4.4. Model speciﬁcation
We estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model for our main analysis, extending
Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009), Chen et al. (2011a, 2011b) and Ben-Nasr et al. (2012):17 Ad
techniq
and Fr
18 Spe
and thditional criticisms to the realized return measure are that it is a poor and potentially biased proxy (Elton, 1999), its standard
ues require a fairly long time-series (Stulz, 1999) and that it generates large standard errors and produces imprecise estimates (Fama
ench, 1997).
ciﬁcally, in the U.S. setting, analysts forecasts are, on average, optimistically biased (e.g., O’Brien, 1988; Richardson et al., 2004)
is optimism likely leads to an upward bias in the estimated cost of capital (e.g., by 2.84% as reported in Easton and Sommers, 2007).
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þ a9CROSSLIST it þ a10ACCT it þ a11REFORMit þ atRtYEARt þ ajRjINDj þ eit ð1Þwhere CC refers to one of the four implied cost of equity capital measures: RGLS, RDIV, ROJN and RPEG. FIN
refers to the stock market development measuresMKTCAP,MKTLIQ, FINAVG, or the banking development
measure CREDIT. Model (1) controls for other known determinants of the cost of equity used in related stud-
ies (Hail and Leuz, 2009; Chen et al., 2011a, 2011b; Ben-Nasr et al., 2012): ﬁrm size measured as the natural
logarithm of the market value of equity SIZE; book value to the market value of equity MB; market beta
BETA; return momentum MOM; ratio of earnings to book value of equity ROE; ratio of total liabilities to
total assets LEV; inﬂation rate in the future twelve months CPI; dummy for cross-listing CROSSLIST; indi-
cator variable ACCT for the implementation of the new accounting standards in 2007; indicator variable
REFORM for the split-share structure reform in 2005; and dummies YEAR and IND for ﬁxed year and indus-
try eﬀects. We expect a1 to be negative if stock market development and banking development decrease the
cost of equity. Drawing on prior studies, we expect the coeﬃcients on SIZE, MB, MOM, ROE and ACCT
to be negative, while those on BETA, LEV and CPI to be positive. We do not make directional predictions
for coeﬃcients on CROSSLIST and REFORM. 195. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample with Panel A providing descriptive statistics for all
main test variables. The means (medians) of the implied cost of equity capital measures RGLS, RDIV, RPEG and
ROJN are 6.873% (5.610%), 8.856% (4.850%), 11.238% (9.130%) and 14.844% (12.821%), respectively. These
estimates are consistent with prior studies on Chinese, U.S. and international capital markets. Speciﬁcally,
the reported mean RGLS is comparable to that of 6.600% for Chinese listed ﬁrms in Chen et al. (2011a)
and 7.690% for forty countries in Hail and Leuz (2009). The mean RDIV of 8.856% is comparable to that
of 11.40% in Botosan and Plumlee (2002). The mean RPEG of 11.238% is consistent with a ﬁgure of
13.080% in an international setting in Hail and Leuz (2006). The mean ROJN of 14.844% is comparable to that
of 12.440% for Chinese listed ﬁrms in Shen (2007) and 13.77% in Hail and Leuz (2006). For the stock market
development measures, the mean (median) of the capitalization-based measure MKTCAP is 0.163 (0.102)
which is consistent with the reported value of 0.139 by CSRC (2008) for the same period, and the mean (med-
ian) of the liquidity-based measure MKTLIQ is 0.659 (0.390). The mean banking development measure
CREDIT is 1.064, which is comparable to that of 1.010 in Wu et al. (2012).
Panel B reports the coeﬃcients of Pearson pair-wise correlations among our main test variables. The cor-
relation coeﬃcients among the four cost of capital measures range from 0.348 to 0.945, consistent with
Botosan and Plumlee (2005) that reports a range between 0.300 and 0.860. The evidence is also in line with
the reported correlations among RGLS, RPEG and ROJN in Hail and Leuz (2006), which is between 0.300
and 0.860, and in Ben-Nasr et al. (2012), which is between 0.549 and 0.948. These high correlations suggest
that the four measures capture the same underlying construct for the cost of equity capital. In addition,
the four estimates are all signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with ﬁrm size, with its coeﬃcients ranging from
0.353 to 0.083. They are also signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with the MB ratio and return momentum
MOM, but positively correlated with market beta when the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant. These signiﬁcant cor-
relations between the four estimates and ﬁrm risk variables further strengthen the empirical validity for our
cost of equity measures. Importantly, the four cost of equity estimates are all signiﬁcantly negatively corre-
lated with the ﬁnancial development measures, with coeﬃcients ranging from 0.217 to 0.020. Though onlyen et al. (2011a) and Hail and Leuz (2009) report mixed evidence for the coeﬃcients on CROSSLIST in the China setting and
tional setting, respectively. The split-share structure reform in China could aﬀect the relation between ﬁnancial development and
t of equity through its risk-sharing and price impact when more shares come to the stock market (Xin and Xu, 2007; Li et al., 2011),
have opposite eﬀects on the cost of capital. If the risk-sharing eﬀect (price impact eﬀect) dominates, REFORM is expected to be
ely (positively) associated with the cost of equity.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Median STD Q1 Q3
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for variables used in the empirical analysis
RGLS 6.873 5.610 5.270 3.587 8.428
RDIV 8.856 4.85 12.277 0.000 15.692
RPEG 11.238 9.130 8.057 5.384 14.700
ROJN 14.844 12.821 7.607 9.355 18.225
MKTCAP 0.163 0.102 0.178 0.060 0.194
MKTLIQ 0.659 0.390 0.817 0.203 0.790
FINAVG 0.411 0.237 0.494 0.137 0.502
CREDIT 1.064 0.991 0.338 0.823 1.234
MTKIPO 0.169 0.018 0.886 0.007 0.052
CRTLIA 0.205 0.209 0.043 0.177 0.227
SIZE 7.768 7.659 0.911 7.134 8.255
MB 3.502 2.659 2.710 1.685 4.378
BETA 0.973 0.967 0.260 0.806 1.131
MOM 0.204 0.033 0.737 0.248 0.486
ROE 0.052 0.068 0.147 0.026 0.112
LEV 0.225 0.213 0.152 0.107 0.325
CPI 0.015 0.014 0.024 0.001 0.025
PATENT 8.992 4.440 10.580 1.440 11.880
EMGMT (Raw) 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.006 0.007
LAW (Raw) 3.360 3.038 1.632 2.494 3.687
BANKMPT (Raw) 6.665 6.790 2.690 5.080 8.580
BANKMKT (Raw) 7.307 7.240 2.724 5.340 9.670
BANKDST (Raw) 7.792 8.120 3.685 5.050 10.590
PRIVECON (Raw) 7.630 7.730 3.198 5.000 10.050
PRIVEINT (Raw) 9.031 9.490 3.829 6.090 11.750
PRIVESAL (Raw) 6.654 6.460 3.241 4.400 9.400
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix for main testing variables and control variables
1. RGLS 1
2. RDIV 0.415 1
3. RPEG 0.486 0.409 1
4. ROJN 0.434 0.348 0.945 1
5. MKTCAP 0.116 0.217 0.131 0.118 1
6. MKTLIQ 0.099 0.200 0.097 0.085 0.950 1
7. FINAVG 0.103 0.205 0.104 0.091 0.966 0.998 1
8. CREDIT 0.020 0.031 0.065 0.065 0.503 0.362 0.390 1
9. SIZE 0.177 0.353 0.121 0.083 0.369 0.365 0.368 0.115 1
10. MB 0.296 0.331 0.271 0.239 0.234 0.233 0.235 0.016 0.228 1
11. BETA 0.014 0.042 0.050 0.007 0.017 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.200 0.055 1
12. MOM 0.187 0.320 0.179 0.161 0.280 0.324 0.318 0.033 0.353 0.431 0.067 1
Panel A in this table reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the main tests for the full sample of 10,321 ﬁrm-year observations
from 1998 to 2008. Panel B reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the main testing variables wherein highlighted ﬁgures indicate that a
correlation coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at least at the 5% level.
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vince-level regional ﬁnancial development lowers the cost of equity capital. We next conduct multivariate
analyses.5.2. The eﬀect of stock market development on the cost of equity
Table 2 presents the results of OLS regressions examining whether regional stock market development
explains the variation in the cost of equity beyond its conventional determinants. In Table 2, the dependent
variable is the cost of equity estimate RGLS in all models, with Models 1–3 reporting the results for the full
Table 2
Relations between stock market development and the implied cost of equity capital proxied by RGLS.
OLS regressions for full sample OLS regressions for non-SOE subsample OLS regressions for SOE subsample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Intercept 8.673 (5.35)*** 8.736 (5.37)*** 8.723 (5.37)*** 26.22 (3.58)*** 26.261 (3.59)*** 26.254 (3.58)*** 6.789 (5.68)*** 6.820 (5.71)*** 6.813 (5.70)***
MKTCAP 0.116 (2.94)*** 0.324 (3.06)*** 0.063 (1.54)
MKTLIQ 0.026 (3.01)*** 0.070 (3.05)*** 0.015 (1.63)
FINAVG 0.043 (3.00)*** 0.117 (3.05)*** 0.024 (1.62)
SIZE 0.271 (2.06)** 0.280 (2.14)** 0.278 (2.12)** 0.426 (1.53) 0.445 (1.59) 0.441 (1.58) 0.152 (1.15) 0.156 (1.19) 0.155 (1.18)
MB 0.335 (5.05)*** 0.336 (5.05)*** 0.335 (5.05)*** 0.257 (2.35)** 0.262 (2.38)** 0.261 (2.37)** 0.351 (5.27)*** 0.352 (5.28)*** 0.352 (5.28)***
BETA 0.044 (0.20) 0.043 (0.20) 0.043 (0.20) 0.139 (0.31) 0.147 (0.33) 0.145 (0.32) 0.032 (0.15) 0.031 (0.15) 0.031 (0.15)
MOM 0.738 (5.66)*** 0.734 (5.60)*** 0.734 (5.61)*** 0.991 (5.15)*** 0.987 (5.19)*** 0.986 (5.18)*** 0.701 (4.17)*** 0.698 (4.12)*** 0.698 (4.13)***
ROE 1.410 (1.98)** 1.412 (1.98)** 1.412 (1.98)** 0.567 (0.41) 0.578 (0.41) 0.576 (0.41) 1.717 (2.52)*** 1.719 (2.52)*** 1.719 (2.52)***
LEV 2.559 (4.47)*** 2.562 (4.48)*** 2.562 (4.47)*** 3.306 (1.53) 3.295 (1.53) 3.296 (1.53) 2.362 (4.54)*** 2.364 (4.55)*** 2.364 (4.54)***
CPI 5.581 (1.11) 5.336 (1.06) 5.371 (1.07) 4.132 (0.55) 5.248 (0.66) 5.106 (0.65) 7.304 (1.48) 7.176 (1.46) 7.196 (1.46)
CROSSLIST 0.154 (0.54) 0.172 (0.60) 0.168 (0.59) 0.984 (1.63) 1.117 (1.83)* 1.087 (1.78)* 0.106 (0.36) 0.114 (0.39) 0.112 (0.38)
ACCT 1.681 (5.78)*** 1.596 (5.32)*** 1.608 (5.39)*** 1.649 (5.45)*** 1.445 (4.00)*** 1.471 (4.17)*** 1.749 (4.46)*** 1.696 (4.31)*** 1.704 (4.33)***
REFORM 4.388 (17.03)*** 4.353 (16.77)*** 4.359 (16.80)*** 2.312 (3.64)*** 2.330 (3.44)*** 2.326 (3.47)*** 4.147 (19.39)*** 4.127 (19.55)*** 4.130 (19.49)***
IND and YEAR
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 10,321 10,321 10,321 1,981 1,981 1,981 8,340 8,340 8,340
R-sqr 33.88% 33.87% 33.87% 38.60% 38.50% 38.52% 33.23% 33.23% 33.23%
This table presents OLS regression results for the eﬀect of stock market development on the implied cost of equity capital using the following Model (1):
CCit ¼ a0 þ a1FINit þ a2SIZEit þ a3MBit þ a4BETAit þ a5MOMit þ a6ROEit þ a7LEV it þ a8CPI þ a9CROSSLIST it þ a10ACCT it þ a11REFORMit þ atRtYEARt þ ajRjINDj þ eit ð1Þ
where CC refers to the implied cost of equity capital measure RGLS. FIN refers to stock market development measures MKTCAP, MKTLIQ and FINAVG. Control variables include
ﬁrm size SIZE, market-to-book ratio MB, market beta BETA, momentum MOM, return on equity ROE, leverage ratio LEV, inﬂation rate CPI, and dummies for cross-listing
CROSSLIST, new accounting standard ACCT, split-share structure reform REFORM, year eﬀects YEAR, and industry eﬀects IND. Models 1–3 report results for the full sample,
Models 4–6 report results for the subsample of non-SOE ﬁrm-years, and Models 7–9 report results for the subsample of SOE ﬁrm-years. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in
Appendix A. t-statistics are adjusted for ﬁrm- and year-speciﬁc clusters.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 243–277 255sample, Models 4–6 for the subsample of non-SOEs, and Models 7–9 for the subsample of SOEs. Models 1–3
show that the three stock market development measures—the market capitalization based measureMKTCAP,
the market liquidity based measureMKTLIQ and their average FINAVG—are all signiﬁcantly negatively asso-
ciated with the cost of equity measure RGLS, with coeﬃcients (t-statistics) of 0.116 (2.94), 0.026 (3.01)
and 0.043 (3.00), respectively. The results imply that a one standard deviation increase in MKTCAP,
MKTLIQ or FINAVG, which is 0.178, 0.817 or 0.494, respectively, leads to a decrease in RGLS of about
206.5, 212.4 or 212.4 basis points, respectively. Similarly, for the non-SOE subsample, these stock market
development measures are also signiﬁcantly negatively related to RGLS in Models 4–6, with a one standard
deviation increase in MKTCAP, MKTLIQ or FINAVG corresponding to 576.7, 57.7 or 578.0 basis points of
decrease in RGLS, respectively. In contrast, for the SOE subsample, these stock market development measures
are only weakly negatively related to RGLS in Models 7–8. The result suggests that for the subsample of SOEs,
the negative side of stock market development in China cancels out its beneﬁcial side; government interference
and expropriation induce additional investment risk, and consequently, result in an insigniﬁcant eﬀect of stock
market development on the cost of equity. The diﬀerences in results between SOEs and non-SOEs are also
consistent with our expectations, and imply that the result for the full sample is mainly driven by non-SOEs.
Table 3 presents results for the eﬀects of stock market development on alternative estimates of the implied
cost of equity, RDIV, RPEG and ROJN, with RDIV used in Models 1–3, RPEG in Models 4–6 and ROJN in Models
7–9. As shown in Table 3, all stock market development measures, MKTCAP, MKTLIQ and FINAVG, are
signiﬁcantly negatively associated with RDIV, RPEG and ROJN, rendering further support to the ﬁndings in
Table 2 and indicating our results are robust to alternative implied cost of equity measures. Results for control
variables in Tables 2 and 3 are consistent with those reported in prior research: ﬁrm size, market-to-book
ratio, return momentum, return on equity and the indicator for new accounting rules are all negatively related
to, while market beta and leverage ratio are positively associated with, all the cost of equity estimates RGLS,
RDIV, RPEG and ROJN. The coeﬃcient of the indicator for the split-share structure reform is signiﬁcantly pos-
itive, suggesting that the price impact dominates.
In summary, the results in Tables 2 and 3 show that stock market development lowers the cost of equity
after controlling for all other known determinants of the cost of equity. These results suggest that investors
generally charge a lower risk premium to ﬁrms located in regions with more developed stock markets. We
explain that the positive side of stock market development in China such as providing liquidity, reducing
information asymmetry and enhancing external monitoring dominates its negative side, and on net, leads
to a lower cost of equity.
5.3. The relation between banking development and the cost of equity capital
In this subsection, we examine the relation between banking development and the cost of equity for the full
sample and the subsamples of non-SOEs and SOEs, respectively. Table 4 reports the estimation results. For
the full sample, the banking development measure CREDIT is insigniﬁcantly associated with the cost of equity
measures RGLS, RDIV and ROJN. Only when RPEG is used as the dependent variable is the coeﬃcient on
CREDIT signiﬁcantly negative at the 10% level. The relatively weak eﬀect of banking development on miti-
gating the cost of equity is consistent with our argument that the pervasive state ownership of the big four
banks and the lack of banking competition in China constrain a bank’s legitimate functions of liquidity pro-
vision, risk-sharing, monitoring and information production. Therefore, regional banking development in
China plays a limited role in alleviating systematic uncertainty in the economy and is only weakly negatively
associated with the cost of equity. We also split the full sample into non-SOE and SOE subsamples. In Model
2, banking development CREDIT is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with the cost of equity RGLS for the
non-SOE subsample. In contrast, in Model 3, it is weakly negatively associated with RGLS for the SOE sub-
sample. The results support the argument that banking development generates more incremental beneﬁts to
non-SOEs, and thus, investors charge a lower cost of capital. However, for SOEs, the negative side of banking
development dominates its cost-reducing eﬀect, and the eﬀect is further enhanced by the negative side of gov-
ernment ownership and interference in SOEs, thus resulting in an insigniﬁcant relation between banking devel-
opment and the cost of equity in these ﬁrms.
Table 3
Relations between stock market development and the implied cost of equity capital proxied by RDIV, RPEG and ROJN.
Dependent variable: RDIV Dependent variable: RPEG Dependent variable: ROJN
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t- stat.
Intercept 17.259 (2.71)*** 17.386 (2.73)*** 17.360 (2.73)*** 0.063 (4.13)*** 0.065 (4.23)*** 0.065 (4.21)*** 11.634 (6.66)*** 11.786 (6.70)*** 11.751 (6.69)***
MKTCAP 0.237 (3.05)*** 0.003 (3.89)*** 0.291 (4.53)***
MKTLIQ 0.053 (2.71)*** 0.001 (3.27)*** 0.071 (3.82)***
FINAVG 0.088 (2.79)*** 0.001 (3.37)*** 0.115 (3.96)***
SIZE 2.238 (2.82)*** 2.256 (2.84)*** 2.252 (2.83)*** 0.000 (0.05) 0.000 (0.15) 0.000 (0.13) 0.277 (1.37) 0.260 (1.27) 0.265 (1.30)
MB 0.285 (2.02)** 0.287 (2.04)** 0.287 (2.03)** 0.004 (4.32)*** 0.004 (4.36)*** 0.004 (4.35)*** 0.383 (4.66)*** 0.387 (4.71)*** 0.386 (4.70)***
BETA 1.310 (2.21)** 1.309 (2.22)** 1.309 (2.22)** 0.006 (1.31) 0.006 (1.28) 0.006 (1.29) 0.365 (0.71) 0.360 (0.69) 0.361 (0.69)
MOM 2.763 (9.05)*** 2.754 (9.18)*** 2.754 (9.15)*** 0.011 (6.37)*** 0.011 (6.36)*** 0.011 (6.35)*** 0.890 (5.57)*** 0.870 (5.58)*** 0.873 (5.57)***
ROE 3.021 (2.55)*** 3.026 (2.56)*** 3.026 (2.56)*** 0.006 (0.58) 0.007 (0.60) 0.007 (0.59) 1.202 (1.03) 1.225 (1.06) 1.223 (1.06)
LEV 0.756 (0.88) 0.762 (0.88) 0.760 (0.88) 0.052 (8.80)*** 0.052 (8.70)*** 0.052 (8.72)*** 4.541 (8.21)*** 4.546 (8.08)*** 4.544 (8.10)***
CPI 30.888 (1.29) 30.378 (1.27) 30.452 (1.27) 0.174 (1.44) 0.167 (1.38) 0.168 (1.39) 12.659 (1.51) 11.737 (1.39) 11.889 (1.41)
CROSSLIST 0.516 (0.87) 0.479 (0.81) 0.488 (0.83) 0.002 (0.52) 0.002 (0.44) 0.002 (0.46) 0.205 (0.42) 0.173 (0.36) 0.181 (0.38)
ACCT 10.372 (5.43)*** 10.197 (5.22)*** 10.222 (5.26)*** 0.027 (3.83)*** 0.025 (3.29)*** 0.025 (3.39)*** 2.532 (4.94)*** 2.253 (4.12)*** 2.300 (4.28)***
REFORM 20.143 (21.25)*** 20.069 (20.99)*** 20.082 (21.04)*** 0.068 (15.83)*** 0.067 (14.92)*** 0.068 (15.10)*** 3.011 (9.19)*** 2.903 (8.43)*** 2.923 (8.59)***
IND and
YEAR
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way
clusters
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 10,321 10,321 10,321 4,509 4,509 4,509 3,953 3,953 3,953
R-sqr 48.65% 48.64% 48.66% 23.8% 23.8% 23.82% 21.26% 21.27% 21.28%
This table presents OLS regression results for the eﬀect of stock market development on the implied cost of equity capital for the full sample using the following Model (1):
CCit ¼ a0 þ a1FINit þ a2SIZEit þ a3MBit þ a4BETAit þ a5MOMit þ a6ROEit þ a7LEV it þ a8CPI þ a9CROSSLIST it þ a10ACCT it þ a11REFORMit þ atRtYEARt þ ajRjINDj þ eit ð1Þ
where CC refers to the implied cost of equity capital measures RDIV, RPEG and ROJN. FIN refers to the stock market development measuresMKTCAP,MKTLIQ and FINAVG. Control
variables include ﬁrm size SIZE, market-to-book ratio MB, market beta BETA, momentum MOM, return on equity ROE, leverage ratio LEV, inﬂation rate CPI, and dummies for
cross-listing CROSSLIST, new accounting standard ACCT, split-share structure reform REFORM, year eﬀects YEAR, and industry eﬀects IND. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in
Appendix A. t-statistics are adjusted for ﬁrm- and year-speciﬁc clusters.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 4
Relations between banking development and the implied cost of equity capital proxied by RGLS, RDIV, RPEG and ROJN.
Dependent variable:
RGLS
Dependent variable:
RDIV
Dependent variable:
RPEG
Dependent variable:
ROJN
Full sample Non-SOE subsample SOE subsample Full sample Full sample Full sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Intercept 9.021 (5.48)*** 25.287 (3.57)*** 11.138 (7.91)*** 17.470 (2.70)*** 0.071 (4.48)*** 12.408 (6.78)***
CREDIT 0.389 (1.52) 1.412 (2.59)*** 0.435 (1.52) 0.128 (0.25) 0.005 (1.81)* 0.454 (1.40)
SIZE 0.284 (2.15)** 0.495 (1.78)* 0.224 (1.45) 2.329 (2.94)*** 0.001 (0.46) 0.185 (0.89)
MB 0.337 (5.10)*** 0.287 (2.54)*** 0.479 (3.00)*** 0.295 (2.07)** 0.004 (4.33)*** 0.388 (4.67)***
BETA 0.060 (0.27) 0.154 0.36 0.119 (0.57) 1.322 (2.29)** 0.006 (1.33) 0.394 (0.74)
MOM 0.779 (5.82)*** 1.051 (5.90)*** 0.764 (6.18)*** 2.832 (9.25)*** 0.012 (6.71)*** 0.979 (5.94)***
ROE 1.370 (1.92)* 0.462 (0.33) 0.75 (0.77) 2.946 (2.49)*** 0.005 (0.46) 1.036 (0.88)
LEV 2.571 (4.54)*** 3.539 1.61 1.716 (3.26)*** 0.805 (0.94) 0.052 (8.72)*** 4.553 (8.26)***
CPI 6.441 (1.29) 1.03 (0.14) 10.699 (1.05) 31.816 (1.33) 0.193 (1.62) 14.730 (1.78)*
CROSSLIST 0.203 (0.72) 1.278 (2.23)** 0.221 (0.60) 0.354 (0.61) 0.001 (0.27) 0.079 (0.16)
ACCT 1.904 (6.30)*** 1.828 (6.16)*** 1.196 (3.77)*** 10.733 (5.57)*** 0.032 (4.35)*** 3.008 (5.75)***
REFORM 4.419 (17.81)*** 2.234 (3.42)*** 1.626 (3.04)*** 20.135 (21.48)*** 0.069 (17.07)*** 3.060 (10.09)***
IND and YEAR
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 10,321 1,981 4,583 10,321 4,509 3,953
R-sqr 33.83% 37.83% 38.02% 48.58% 23.8% 20.95%
Panel A presents OLS regression results for the eﬀect of banking development measure CREDIT on the implied cost of equity capital using the Model (1) below:
CCit ¼ a0 þ a1FINit þ a2SIZEit þ a3MBit þ a4BETAit þ a6ROEit þ a7LEV it þ a8CPI þ a9CROSSLIST it þ a10ACCT it þ a11REFORMit þ atRtYEARt þ ajRjINDj þ eit ð1Þ
where CC refers to the implied cost of equity capital measures RGLS, RDIV, ROJN and RPEG in Models 1–4, respectively. FIN refers to the banking development measure CREDIT.
Other variables are the same as in Table 2. Using RGLS as the dependent variable, Model 1 reports results for the full sample and Models 2 and 3 report results for the subsamples of
non-SOE ﬁrm-quarters and SOE ﬁrm-quarters, respectively. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are adjusted for ﬁrm-speciﬁc and year-speciﬁc clusters.
* Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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258 J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 243–2775.4. Firm growth, innovation and their impact on the relation between ﬁnancial development and the cost of equity
We next examine whether and how ﬁrm growth and innovation aﬀect the relation between stock market
development, banking development and the cost of equity. As mentioned earlier, the listing process in
China favors state-owned (mature) ﬁrms and discriminates against fast-growing and innovation-intensive
ﬁrms, especially when they are non-SOEs. This systematic bias may weaken the negative relation between
stock market development and the cost of equity. We measure a ﬁrm’s growth potential as the market to book
ratio MB, following Hail and Leuz (2009). We gauge a ﬁrm’s innovation intensity by the ratio of the number
of patent applications to the number of researchers in a province reported in Fan et al. (2011) and denote it by
PATENT. We then add the interactions of MB and PATENT with the three stock market development mea-
sures of MKTCAP, MKTLIQ and FINAVG, respectively, to Model (1) to examine their moderating eﬀects on
the relation between stock market development and the cost of equity.
Table 5 reports the estimation results. Panel A reports the interactions of growth potential MB with all
stock market development and banking development measures. The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms
are all signiﬁcantly positive in Models 1–3, supporting the prediction that the mitigating eﬀect of stock market
development on equity cost diminishes in ﬁrms with high growth opportunities. Similarly, the interactions of
innovation intensity PATENT with all stock market development measures are also signiﬁcantly positively
associated with the cost of equity RGLS across Models 5–7 in Panel B. Untabulated results reveal that the same
eﬀects still hold for the non-SOE subsample, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be driven by listing
discrimination against non-SOEs. The results in Table 5, taken together, show that the negative association
between stock market development and the cost of equity is weaker for ﬁrms with high growth opportunities
and intensive innovation, which is consistent with our expectations.
However, the above ﬁnding is in contrast to evidence in Brown et al. (2013) and Hsu et al. (2014) where
stock market ﬁnancing generally leads to substantially higher long-run R&D investment. This inconsistency
points to a weakness of the Chinese stock market of failing to provide suﬃcient equity ﬁnancing to ﬁrms with
high growth potential and innovation intensity. A direct policy implication is that the role of stock market
development in improving capital allocation eﬃciency and reducing the cost of equity can be enhanced should
there be stock market regulations that mitigate equity ﬁnancing biases against fast-growing and innovation-
intensive ﬁrms. In all models, the coeﬃcients on MKTCAP, MKTLIQ and FINAVG per se and their sum with
the corresponding interactions are still negative, indicating that the baseline result that stock market develop-
ment decreases the cost of equity holds even after accounting for the moderating eﬀects of growth potential
and innovation intensity.
Models 4 and 8 of Table 5 indicate that the coeﬃcients for the interactions of growth potential MB and
innovation intensity PATENT with banking development CREDIT are statistically insigniﬁcant, consistent
with the view that ﬁrm growth potential and innovation intensity do not alter the eﬀect of banking develop-
ment on the cost of equity. This ﬁnding is consistent with the evidence in Brown et al. (2013) and Hsu et al.
(2014) that credit market development generally does not enhance innovation and growth potential. In both
models, the coeﬃcients on CREDIT per se and its sum with the corresponding interactions are still insignif-
icant, indicating that the baseline result that banking development is insigniﬁcantly associated with the cost of
equity holds even after incorporating the eﬀects of growth potential and innovation intensity into our analysis.
6. Further analysis: the eﬀects of institutional factors
6.1. Accounting quality, legal enforcement and the relation between stock market development and the cost of
equity
We now examine whether and how accounting quality and legal enforcement aﬀect the negative relation
between stock market development and the cost of equity, and whether the cost of equity eﬀect of stock mar-
ket development still holds after considering these moderating eﬀects. Existing evidence suggests that stock
market development either complements or substitutes for accounting quality and legal enforcement in its
relation with the cost of equity. Ball (2001) reports that high-quality accounting standard implementation
at the ﬁrm level complements high-quality accounting standards and strong legal enforcement at the national
Table 5
Growth opportunities, innovation and relations between stock market development, banking development and the implied cost of equity capital proxied by RGLS.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef t-stat. Coef t-stat. Coef t-stat.
Intercept 8.757 (5.37)*** 8.836 (5.37)*** 8.821 (5.37)*** 8.679 (5.20)*** 8.617 (8.58)*** 8.692 (8.50)*** 8.536 (8.24)*** 8.774 (5.26)***
MKTCAP 0.226 (3.42)*** 0.151 (6.01)***
MB
*
MKTCAP 0.023 (2.51)***
PATENT
*
MKTCAP 0.001 (5.19)***
MKTLIQ 0.053 (3.14)*** 0.034 (5.36)***
MB
*
MKTLIQ 0.006 (2.41)**
PATENT *MKTLIQ 0.003 (4.49)***
FINAVG 0.087 (3.20)*** 0.061 (5.83)***
MB * FINAVG 0.009 (2.44)
**
PATENT * FINAVG 0.001 (5.70)
***
CREDIT 0.000 (0.00) 0.006 (0.30)
MB
*
CREDIT 0.115 (1.28)
PATENT
*
CREDIT 0.176 (0.51)
PATENT 0.020 (14.50)*** 0.022 (11.55)*** 0.023 (14.91)*** 0.008 (0.32)
SIZE 0.255 (2.02)** 0.266 (2.12)** 0.264 (2.10)** 0.290 (2.17)** 0.254 (3.01)*** 0.263 (3.11)*** 0.261 (3.13)*** 0.274 (2.09)**
MB 0.388 (6.12)*** 0.387 (6.23)*** 0.388 (6.21)*** 0.213 (2.06)** 0.328 (5.94)*** 0.329 (5.94)*** 0.329 (5.95)*** 0.337 (5.11)***
BETA 0.065 (0.30) 0.066 (0.30) 0.066 (0.30) 0.054 (0.25) 0.048 (0.32) 0.044 (0.29) 0.042 (0.29) 0.048 (0.22)
MOM 0.755 (5.62)*** 0.765 (5.78)*** 0.763 (5.74)*** 0.795 (6.01)*** 0.836 (7.21)*** 0.831 (7.08)*** 0.822 (7.14)*** 0.788 (5.89)***
ROE 1.477 (2.12)** 1.493 (2.13)** 1.491 (2.13)** 1.353 (1.91)* 1.365 (2.33)** 1.365 (2.32)** 1.367 (2.33)** 1.351 (1.90)*
LEV 2.571 (4.50)*** 2.587 (4.54)*** 2.584 (4.53)*** 2.583 (4.56)*** 2.543 (6.45)*** 2.545 (6.49)*** 2.542 (6.46)*** 2.567 (4.52)***
CPI 5.600 (1.18) 5.402 (1.14) 5.430 (1.15) 6.121 (1.18) 5.884 (1.14) 5.621 (1.09) 6.158 (1.23) 7.235 (1.48)
CROSSLIST 0.152 (0.54) 0.171 (0.60) 0.167 (0.59) 0.199 (0.70) 0.088 (0.76) 0.104 (0.90) 0.091 (0.79) 0.14 (0.50)
ACCT 1.614 (6.62)*** 1.483 (6.38)*** 1.503 (6.43)*** 1.908 (6.31)*** 1.376 (4.49)*** 1.211 (3.86)*** 1.237 (4.03)*** 1.796 (5.74)***
REFORM 4.301 (18.37)*** 4.246 (18.09)*** 4.255 (18.14)*** 4.414 (17.95)*** 4.282 (15.15)*** 4.248 (15.01)*** 4.439 (15.57)*** 4.582 (18.98)***
IND and YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 10,321 10,321 10,321 10,321 10,321 10,321 10,321 10,321
R-sqr 33.95% 33.94% 33.94% 33.87% 33.86% 33.85% 33.86% 33.88%
This table presents OLS regression results for the eﬀects of growth opportunitiesMB and innovation PATENT on the relation between ﬁnancial development and the implied cost of
equity, respectively, using the following two models that extend Model (1):
CCit ¼ a0 þ a1FINit þ a2FINit MBit þ a3SIZEit þ a4MBit þ a5BETAit þ a6MOMit þ a7ROEit þ a8LEV it þ a9CPI þ a10CROSSLIST it þ a11ACCT it þ a12REFORMit þ atRtYEARt
þ ajRjINDj þ eit
CCit ¼ a0 þ a1FINit þ a2FINit  PATENT it þ a3PATENT it þ a4SIZEit þ a5MBit þ a6BETAit þ a7MOMit þ a8ROEit þ a9LEV it þ a10CPI þ a11CROSSLIST it þ a12ACCT it
þ a14REFORMit þ atRtYEARt þ ajRjINDj þ eit
where CC refers to the implied cost of equity capital measure RGLS. Other variables are the same as in Table 2. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are adjusted
for ﬁrm-speciﬁc and year-speciﬁc clusters.
* Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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260 J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 243–277level in reducing the cost of equity. In contrast, Hail and Leuz (2009) show that enhanced investor protection
via U.S. cross-listing substitutes for strong legal protection in the home country in lowering the cost of capital.
Prior research documents that accounting standards promote stock market development at the country level
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Brown et al., 2013) and legal factors stimulate ﬁnancial development (La Porta
et al., 1997, 1998; Beck et al., 2003). In short, prior research suggests that stock market development could
either substitute or complement accounting quality and legal enforcement in aﬀecting the cost of equity.
Under the substitution (complementary) scenario, the mitigating eﬀect of stock market development on the
cost of equity becomes weaker (stronger) for ﬁrms in regions with higher accounting quality and/or stronger
law enforcement.
To test the two predictive scenarios, we add the interactions of stock market development with province-
level accounting quality and law enforcement to Model (1). Extending Leuz et al. (2003), we measure account-
ing quality using province-level earnings management denoted by EMGMT, with a lower value indicating bet-
ter province-level accounting quality. 20 Following the convention of Chinese studies, we measure legal
enforcement by the total number of lawyers relative to the population in a province, the legal enforcement
index that captures the protection of shareholders’ rights in Fan et al. (2011). The index is multiplied by neg-
ative one (1) and denoted by LAW, such that the higher the value of LAW, the worse the legal enforcement
in a provincial region.
Table 6 reports the results for the moderating eﬀect of accounting quality EMGMT in Models 1–3 and law
enforcement LAW in Models 4–6. Models 1–3 reveal that the interactions of EMGMT with each of the three
stock market development measures MKTCAP, MKTLIQ and FINAVG are negatively associated with the
implied cost of equity and the associations are signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The results suggest that the miti-
gating eﬀect of stock market development on the cost of equity is stronger for ﬁrms with low province-level
accounting quality, which is in line with the prediction under the substitution scenario. Models 4–6 show that
the interactions between law enforcement LAW and each of three stock market development measures are all
negatively associated with the equity cost measure RGLS and the association is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This
again supports the substitution scenario. Therefore, we conclude that ﬁnancial development substitutes for
both accounting quality and law enforcement in lowering the cost of equity. 21 The coeﬃcients on LAW
per se are all signiﬁcantly positive, consistent with prior evidence that strong legal enforcement is inversely
associated with the cost of equity (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Albuquerque and Wang, 2008; Chen et al., 2009,
2011). 22 Across Table 6, the coeﬃcients on stock market development measures per se are signiﬁcantly neg-
ative in most models, suggesting that the baseline results in Tables 2 and 3 are still preserved after considering
the moderating eﬀects of accounting quality and legal enforcement.6.2. Market integration, split-share structure reform and the relation between stock market development and the
cost of equity
We now examine whether stock market integration and the split-share structure reform substitute or com-
plement stock market development in improving risk-sharing, and thus, in decreasing the cost of equity.
Previous research suggests that integration of stock markets across diﬀerent economies attracts foreign20 Speciﬁcally, we calculate EMGMT by the following procedures. We ﬁrst compute performance-matched discretionary accruals for all
ﬁrm-years for each province-year and then, obtain the median performance-matched discretionary accrual for each province-year. Finally,
we calculate EMGMT as the percentile ranking value of these provincial median values for each province in a year. This measure captures
the combined consequence of insiders’ earnings management activities and accounting rules and thus, addresses the concern that
accounting rules can be circumvented by insiders and do not reﬂect actual reporting practices.
21 We also follow Leuz et al. (2003) and use the ratio of “small proﬁts” to “small losses” in each province in a year, denoted SPROFIT, as
an alternative measure for accounting quality. We ﬁnd that the results using this alternative measure remain qualitatively unchanged. In
addition, Fan et al. (2011) also use the total number of accountants in a population at the provincial level as a sub-index of legal
enforcement for the protection of shareholders’ rights. When using its negative value as an alternative measure for legal enforcement, the
results are qualitatively the same as those reported for LAW.
22 Albuquerque and Wang (2008) argue analytically that weak investor protection induces overinvestment for which investors require a
higher equity premium. In a cross-country setting, Hail and Leuz (2006) and Chen et al. (2011b) document that strong country-level law
enforcement and shareholders’ rights decrease the cost of equity.
Table 6
Accounting quality, law enforcement and relations between stock market development and the implied cost of equity proxied by RGLS.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Intercept 8.654 (7.76)*** 8.733 (7.76)*** 8.714 (7.76)*** 8.921 (8.33)*** 8.896 (8.16)*** 8.917 (8.19)***
MKTCAP 0.056 (1.28) 0.158 (2.06)**
EMGMT *MKTCAP 0.163 (1.91)*
LAW *MKTCAP 0.019 (1.89)*
MKTLIQ 0.015 (1.79)* 0.025 (1.92)*
EMGMT *MKTLIQ 0.034 (1.91)*
LAW *MKTLIQ 0.003 (1.99)**
FINAVG 0.024 (1.66)* 0.047 (2.01)**
EMGMT * FINAVG 0.058 (1.95)*
LAW * FINAVG 0.008 (1.99)**
EMGMT 0.035 (0.12) 0.014 (0.05) 0.000 (0.00)
LAW 0.116 (5.38)*** 0.11 (4.87)*** 0.117 (5.04)***
SIZE 0.280 (3.10)*** 0.289 (3.18)*** 0.287 (3.16)*** 0.279 (3.18)*** 0.283 (3.23)*** 0.282 (3.23)***
MB 0.334 (5.66)*** 0.335 (5.66)*** 0.335 (5.66)*** 0.342 (6.01)*** 0.343 (5.99)*** 0.343 (6.00)***
BETA 0.035 (0.22) 0.034 (0.22) 0.034 (0.22) 0.035 (0.24) 0.034 (0.24) 0.035 (0.24)
MOM 0.838 (7.25)*** 0.832 (7.15)*** 0.832 (7.17)*** 0.351 (2.60)*** 0.346 (2.56)*** 0.346 (2.55)***
ROE 1.294 (2.10)** 1.296 (2.10)** 1.297 (2.10)** 1.493 (2.64)*** 1.487 (2.65)*** 1.488 (2.65)***
LEV 2.385 (6.22)*** 2.389 (6.26)*** 2.388 (6.25)*** 2.511 (6.08)*** 2.516 (6.08)*** 2.515 (6.07)***
CPI 4.218 (0.76) 3.870 (0.69) 3.918 (0.70) 0.479 (0.13) 0.442 (0.12) 0.427 (0.12)
CROSSLIST 0.111 (0.90) 0.128 (1.01) 0.124 (0.98) 0.077 (0.75) 0.08 (0.77) 0.078 (0.76)
ACCT 1.353 (4.50)*** 1.237 (3.88)*** 1.255 (3.99)*** 1.278 (12.58)*** 1.254 (10.76)*** 1.247 (10.70)***
REFORM 4.403 (16.56)*** 4.367 (15.95)*** 4.373 (16.07)*** 4.818 (19.24)*** 4.837 (19.54)*** 4.83 (19.39)***
IND and YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 9752 9752 9752 10,321 10,321 10,321
R-sqr 35.15% 35.13% 35.14% 34.11% 34.11% 34.10%
This table presents OLS regression results for the eﬀects of provincial-level accounting quality and law enforcement on relations between stock market development and the implied cost
of equity capital using the following model that extends Model (1):
CCit ¼ a0 þ a2FINit þ a1FINit  REGit þ a3REGit þ a4SIZEit þ a5MBit þ a6BETAit þ a7MOMit þ a8ROEit þ a9LEV it þ a10CPI þ a11CROSSLIST it þ a12ACCT it þ a13REFORMit
þ atRtYEARt þ ajRjINDj þ eit
where CC refers to the implied cost of equity capital measure RGLS. FIN refers to stock market development measuresMKTCAP andMKTLIQ in Models 1 and 2, respectively, and to
their average FINAVG in Model 3. REG refers to province-level accounting quality measure EMGMT in Models 1–3 and to law enforcement LAW in Models 4–6. Other variables are
the same as in Table 2. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are adjusted for ﬁrm-speciﬁc and year-speciﬁc clusters.
* Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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262 J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 243–277investors and enhances risk-sharing among domestic and foreign investors, which in turn decreases the cost of
equity. For example, De Jong and De Roon (2005) report that stock market integration across countries
decreases the cost of equity in emerging markets by improving risk-sharing. The predominance of non-trad-
able shares in the stock market in China poses a major problem because excess holdings of a stock expose
shareholders to high idiosyncratic risk. The split-share structure reform implemented in 2005 allows holders
of non-tradable shares to publicly trade and reduce their shareholdings such that their equity portfolios can be
more diversiﬁed (Li et al., 2011). Therefore, the reform facilitates risk-sharing between owners of non-tradable
and tradable shares and thus may reduce the cost of equity (Li et al., 2011).
Similar to the stock market integration and the split-share structure reform, stock market development
improves inter-temporal risk-sharing by attracting potential investors and facilitating their risk-sharing with
current investors. However, it is an empirical question whether and how this inter-temporal risk-sharing func-
tion of stock market development, the cross-sectional risk-sharing function of market integration and the
split-share structure reform aﬀect the eﬀect of stock market development on lowering the cost of equity.
Stated another way, the moderating eﬀects of market integration and the split-share structure reform on
the negative relation between stock market development and the cost of equity are empirical questions. 23
To test the eﬀect of stock market integration, we ﬁrst construct a measure for stock market integration in a
province and in other provinces by extending procedures suggested by Korajczyk and Viallet (1989) and
Levine and Zervos (1998). We initially estimate the intercept ai from the following CAPM model at the
end of a calendar year for each ﬁrm. 2423 Ho
(Xin a
lower
develo
impact
24 Th
Bekaer
integraRit ¼ ai þ biP t þ eit; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;m; t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T ; ð2Þ
where Rit is the excess monthly return for ﬁrm i in month t in excess of the monthly risk-free rate in the same
month. Pt is the excess return on a value-weighted portfolio of A-shares in the two stock exchanges, SHSE and
SZSE. Assuming that the above CAPM model is reasonable and applicable for the China setting, the absolute
value of the intercept ai estimated from Model (6) should capture market integration for each stock i. The
stock market integration for each provincial market in each year is estimated as minus one (1) times the aver-
age of the absolute value of ai across all A-share stocks in a province in each year such that a higher value
indicates higher market integration. Our market integration measure MINTG is an indicator for low market
integration that equals one for ﬁrms that fall within the lowest quarter of market integration in the sample and
zero otherwise.
We add the indicator variable,MINTG, and its interaction with stock market development to Model (1) to
test the eﬀect of stock market integration. As shown in Panel A, Table 7, across all models, the interaction
terms of MINTG with all three stock market development measures MKTCAP, MKTLIQ and FINAVG are
signiﬁcantly negative. The results support a substitutive relation between stock market development and mar-
ket integration in lowering the cost of equity. In addition, stock market development measures per se remain
signiﬁcantly negatively associated with the cost of equity, conﬁrming that their relations are robust to the
incorporation of the market integration eﬀect.
To test the eﬀect of the split-share structure reform, we add to Model (1) the interaction between stock mar-
ket development and the reform indicator REFORM for the post-reform period, as well as the interaction
term between REFORM and the market beta BETA. We keep only the same ﬁrms in the pre- and post-reform
periods to control for additional factors or biases not explicitly identiﬁed in the empirical analysis. Panel B,
Table 7 reports the estimated results and shows that across all models, the interactions of REFORM with
stock market development measures are all signiﬁcantly positive. This result suggests that stock marketwever, the split-share structure reform also produces a negative price impact by allowing more shares into the market in a short time
nd Xu, 2007; Li et al., 2011). Xin and Xu (2007) show that ﬁrms located in regions with better institutional development tend to oﬀer
compensation to owners of tradable shares in executing the reform, suggesting that the negative price eﬀect and ﬁnancial
pment also substitute for each other in aﬀecting the cost of equity. Therefore, analysis from the perspective of the negative price
of the reform also leads to the same conjecture.
ere are two types of market integration measures, one is time-invariant and the other is time-variant. Korajczyk and Viallet (1989),
t and Harvey (1995), Stulz (1999), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and de Jong and de Roon (2005) argue or implicitly hold that market
tion increases gradually over time and all use time-varying market integration measures.
Table 7
Market integration, split-share structure reform and the relations between stock market development and the implied cost of equity
proxied by RGLS.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Panel A: Market integration and relations between stock market development and the implied cost of equity
Intercept 8.646 (5.36)*** 8.724 (5.39)*** 8.705 (5.38)***
MKTCAP 0.106 (3.14)***
MINTG *MKTCAP 0.209 (2.46)***
MKTLIQ 0.024 (3.17)***
MINTG *MKTLIQ 0.057 (3.08)***
FINAVG 0.039 (3.17)***
MINTG * FINAVG 0.095 (3.12)***
MINTG 0.057 (0.25) 0.056 (0.25) 0.068 (0.30)
SIZE 0.268 (2.05)** 0.279 (2.13)** 0.276 (2.11)**
MB 0.334 (5.04)*** 0.335 (5.06)*** 0.334 (5.05)***
BETA 0.046 (0.21) 0.046 (0.21) 0.046 (0.21)
MOM 0.741 (5.75)*** 0.738 (5.71)*** 0.738 (5.72)***
ROE 1.418 (1.99)** 1.421 (1.99)** 1.421 (1.99)**
LEV 2.554 (4.44)*** 2.556 (4.45)*** 2.555 (4.45)***
CPI 6.169 (1.24) 5.752 (1.18) 5.844 (1.20)
CROSSLIST 0.141 (0.50) 0.161 (0.57) 0.155 (0.55)
ACCT 1.703 (5.78)*** 1.623 (5.35)*** 1.633 (5.42)***
REFORM 4.422 (16.97)*** 4.382 (16.63)*** 4.388 (16.73)***
IND and YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes
Twoway clusters Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 10,321 10,321 10,321
R-sqr 33.91% 33.89% 33.90%
Panel B: Split-share structure reform and relations between stock market development and the implied cost of equity
Intercept 9.335 (8.44)*** 9.343 (8.49)*** 9.344 (8.48)***
MKTCAP 0.252 (4.45)***
REFORM *MKTCAP 0.167 (2.85)***
MKTLIQ 0.088 (6.35)***
REFORM *MKTLIQ 0.069 (4.92)***
FINAVG 0.132 (5.70)***
REFORM * FINAVG 0.101 (4.28)
***
SIZE 0.320 (3.38)*** 0.327 (3.48)*** 0.325 (3.46)***
MB 0.375 (4.52)*** 0.375 (4.52)*** 0.375 (4.52)***
BETA 0.322 (1.15) 0.323 (1.16) 0.323 (1.16)
REFORM * BETA 0.670 (2.11)** 0.668 (2.10)** 0.668 (2.11)**
MOM 0.464 (3.41)*** 0.461 (3.38)*** 0.462 (3.39)***
ROE 1.393 (1.94)* 1.400 (1.94)* 1.398 (1.94)*
LEV 2.208 (4.90)*** 2.205 (4.91)*** 2.206 (4.91)***
CPI 4.840 (0.93) 4.974 (0.97) 4.957 (0.96)
CROSSLIST 0.132 (0.92) 0.148 (1.00) 0.144 (0.98)
ACCT 1.210 (13.79)*** 1.148 (12.81)*** 1.159 (13.00)***
REFORM 5.147 (14.00)*** 5.156 (14.33)*** 5.148 (14.20)***
IND and YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes
Two-way clusters Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 8357 8358 8357
R-sqr 35.21% 35.20% 35.20%
Panel A of this table presents OLS regression results for the eﬀect of stock market integration on relations between ﬁnancial development
and the implied cost of equity capital, using the following model that extends Model (1):
CCit ¼ a0 þ a2FINit þ a2FINit MINTGit þ a3MINTGit þ a4SIZEit þ a5MBit þ a6BETAit þ a7MOMit þ a8ROEit þ a9LEV it þ a10CPI
þ a11CROSSLIST it þ a12ACCT it þ a13REFORMit þ atRtYEARt þ ajRjINDj þ eit
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where CC refers to the implied cost of equity capital measure RGLS. FIN refers to the stock market development measure MKTCAP in
Model 1, the stock market development measureMKTLIQ in Model 2, and their average FINAVG in Model 3.MINTG is an indicator for
low market integration between the provincial stock market and the national stock market. Other control variables are the same as
described in Model (1).
Panel B of this table presents OLS regression results for the eﬀects of the split-share structure reform on relations between ﬁnancial
development and the implied cost of equity capital using the following model that extends Model (1):
CCit ¼ a0 þ a2FINit þ a2FINit  REFORMit þ a3SIZEit þ a4MBit þ a5BETAit þ a6BETAit  REFORMit þ a7MOMit þ a8ROEit þ a9LEV it
þ a10CPI þ a11CROSSLIST it þ a12ACCT it þ a13REFORMit þ atRtYEARt þ ajRjINDj þ eit
where CC refers to the implied cost of equity capital measure RGLS. FIN refers to the stock market development measures MKTCAP in
Model 1 and MKTLIQ in Model 2 and to their average FINAVG in Model 3. REFORM is an indicator for the period after the split-share
reform in 2005 in China. Other variables are the same as described in Model (1). Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A. t-statis-
tics are adjusted for ﬁrm-speciﬁc and year-speciﬁc clusters.
* Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
264 J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 243–277development substitutes for the split-share structure reform in facilitating cross-sectional risk-sharing between
tradable and non-tradable shareholders, and thus lowers the cost of equity. In addition, our stock market
development measures per se remain negatively associated with the cost of equity, conﬁrming that their rela-
tion is insensitive to the moderating eﬀects of the split-share structure reform. The interaction of
REFORM * BETA is signiﬁcantly negative in all models, suggesting that the enhanced risk-sharing associated
with the split-share structure reform lowers the cost of equity via decreasing the covariance of ﬁrm stock
returns with market returns.6.3. Banking development features, non-state economy characteristics and the relation between banking
development and the cost of equity
We now proceed to examine the institutional factors that aﬀect the relation between banking development
and the cost of equity, aiming to identify potential drivers for the weak mitigating eﬀect of banking develop-
ment on the cost of equity. We focus on banking development features and non-state economy characteristics
in our analysis. We ﬁrst examine the eﬀect of banking competition, banking marketization and credit alloca-
tion eﬃciency, all of which are usually important features accompanying banking development. However,
because the big four state-owned banks historically monopolize the banking industry, banking development
in China is not accompanied by suﬃcient improvement in banking competition, banking marketization and
capital allocation eﬃciency. For example, Lin et al. (2012) report that the dominance of market share of
the big four banks explains the low eﬃciency of the banking sector. To provide further insight into the mod-
erating eﬀect of these banking development features, we measure the lack of banking competition
BANKCMPT, the lack of banking marketization BANKMKT and the lack of credit allocation eﬃciency
BANKDST using the percentile ranking of negative one (1) times the sub-index of banking competition,
banking marketization and credit allocation eﬃciency developed in Fan et al. (2011), respectively. Then, we
add these variables as well as their interactions with CREDIT to Model (1) to see whether and how they aﬀect
the cost of equity. As shown in Models 1–3 of Table 8, we ﬁnd that BANKCMPT * CREDIT,
BANKMKT * CREDIT and BANKDST * CREDIT are signiﬁcantly positively associated with the cost of
equity. These results suggest that the lack of banking competition, banking marketization and credit alloca-
tion eﬃciency at least partially cancels out the beneﬁcial eﬀect of banking development on mitigating the cost
of capital in China. An important implication here is that banking regulation reforms that promote banking
competition, credit allocation eﬃciency and banking marketization enhance the mitigating eﬀect of banking
development on the cost of equity.
Then we look into the moderating eﬀects of the underdevelopment and underinvestment of the non-state
economy and the lack of sales from the non-state economy in aﬀecting the relation between banking
Table 8
Banking development characteristics, non-state economy development and the relations between banking development and the implied cost of equity proxied by RGLS.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Intercept 8.136 (7.82)*** 8.182 (8.08)*** 8.407 (7.90)*** 8.326 (7.93)*** 8.553 (7.99)*** 8.603 (8.18)***
BANKMPT * CREDIT 1.45 (3.64)***
BANKMKT * CREDIT 1.604 (3.56)***
BANKDST * CREDIT 1.316 (2.74)***
PRIVECON * CREDIT 1.146 (2.89)***
PRIVEINT * CREDIT 1.409 (2.73)***
PRIVESAL * CREDIT 0.678 (2.05)**
CREDIT 0.495 (2.39)** 0.457 (2.25)** 0.231 (0.98) 0.261 (1.10) 0.200 (0.78) 0.002 (0.01)
BANKMPT 1.247 (2.80)***
BANKMKT 1.542 (2.78)***
BANKDST 1.226 (2.47)***
PRIVECON 0.872 (1.62)
PRIVEINT 1.176 (1.89)*
PRIVESAL 0.604 (1.37)
SIZE 0.273 (3.10)*** 0.281 (3.16)*** 0.286 (3.21)*** 0.274 (3.10)*** 0.281 (3.18)*** 0.281 (3.15)***
MB 0.336 (5.93)*** 0.336 (5.94)*** 0.336 (5.94)*** 0.337 (5.89)*** 0.337 (5.91)*** 0.337 (5.90)***
BETA 0.044 (0.30) 0.044 (0.30) 0.049 (0.33) 0.046 (0.32) 0.055 (0.37) 0.052 (0.36)
MOM 0.781 (5.79)*** 0.777 (5.69)*** 0.781 (5.85)*** 0.767 (5.93)*** 0.77 (5.95)*** 0.769 (5.82)***
ROE 1.351 (2.26)** 1.35 (2.28)** 1.343 (2.28)** 1.353 (2.26)** 1.344 (2.24)** 1.368 (2.27)**
LEV 2.591 (6.80)*** 2.579 (6.76)*** 2.572 (6.76)*** 2.574 (6.81)*** 2.582 (6.74)*** 2.571 (6.81)***
CPI 7.23 (1.35) 7.159 (1.40) 6.965 (1.41) 7.760 (1.45) 7.563 (1.45) 7.061 (1.32)
CROSSLIST 0.132 (1.16) 0.149 (1.29) 0.174 (1.48) 0.173 (1.31) 0.154 (1.26) 0.201 (1.56)
ACCT 1.872 (6.29)*** 1.892 (6.12)*** 1.88 (5.92)*** 1.873 (6.38)*** 1.875 (6.30)*** 1.905 (6.36)***
REFORM 4.585 (17.99)*** 4.516 (20.09)*** 4.501 (23.34)*** 4.621 (16.16)*** 4.423 (20.16)*** 4.499 (14.70)***
IND and YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 10,321 10,321 10,321 10,321 10,321 10,321
R-sqr 33.91% 33.91% 33.88% 33.88% 33.85% 33.88%
This table presents results for banking development and the non-state economy development characteristics on relations between banking development and the implied cost of equity
using the following model that extends Model (1):
CCit ¼ a0 þ a1FINit þ a2FINit  INT it þ a3INT it þ a4SIZEit þ a5MBit þ a6BETAit þ a7MOMit þ a8ROEit þ a9LEV it þ a10CPI þ a11CROSSLIST it þ a12ACCT it þ a13REFORMit
þ atRtYEARt þ ajRjINDj þ eit ð1Þ
where CC refers to the implied cost of equity measure RGLS. FIN refers to the banking development measure CREDIT. INT refers to the lack of banking competition, banking mar-
ketization and marketization in distribution credit denoted by BANKMPT, BANKMKT and BANKDST, respectively, or the underdevelopment, underinvestment and lack of sale
from the non-state economy, denoted by PRIVECON, PRIVEINT and PRIVESAL, respectively. Other variables are the same as in Model (1). Variable deﬁnitions are provided
in Appendix A. t-statistics are adjusted for ﬁrm-speciﬁc and year-speciﬁc clusters.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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266 J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 243–277development and the cost of equity. 25 Banks operating in regions with these features are subject to more gov-
ernment intervention. Consequently, more lending is allocated to SOEs and ﬁrms with political connections
and there is more lending discrimination against other non-SOEs, both of which may weaken the eﬀect of
banking development on lowering the cost of equity. We gauge the underdevelopment, underinvestment
and lack of sales in the non-state economy by the percentile ranking of negative one (1) times the index
of development, the investment and sales of the non-state economy in Fan et al. (2011), respectively. We
add their interactions with CREDIT as well as their own values to Model (1). As shown in Models 4–6 of
Table 8, consistent with our expectation, the coeﬃcients of the interactions of banking development with
the underdevelopment, underinvestment and lack of sales in the non-state economy (i.e., PRIVECON *
CREDIT, PRIVEINV * CREDIT and PRIVESAL * CREDIT, respectively) are signiﬁcantly positively asso-
ciated with the cost of equity. These ﬁndings also suggest that the development of the non-state economy facil-
itates banking eﬃciency and boosts the mitigating eﬀect of banking development on the cost of equity.7. Robustness checks
7.1. Endogeneity between ﬁnancial development, accounting quality and law enforcement
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Beck et al. (2003) report that diﬀerences in legal enforcement regimes give
rise to variations in ﬁnancial development across countries because ﬁnance is a set of contracts aﬀected by
legal rights and enforcement mechanisms. 26 Acemoglu et al. (2003) show that ﬁnancial development does
not aﬀect a country’s vulnerability to economic shocks after controlling for institutional factors. The evidence
collectively suggests that institutional factors such as legal enforcement regime and accounting quality may
determine the cost of equity eﬀect of ﬁnancial development but not vice versa. In Table 6, we have already
shown that the relation between ﬁnancial development and the cost of equity remains robust after accounting
for the moderating eﬀects of legal regime strength and/or ﬁnancial reporting quality. To further check whether
our baseline results are robust to the potential endogeneity of ﬁnancial development in relation to accounting
quality and legal enforcement, we ﬁrst run OLS regressions of ﬁnancial development measures against the
accounting quality measure EMGMT and the legal enforcement measure LAW. Then, we use the estimated
residuals as alternative ﬁnancial development measures to re-estimate Model (1).
Table 9 reports the regression results. Models 1–4 show that the residual stock market development mea-
sures net of the eﬀect of ﬁnancial reporting quality, denoted by MKTCAPR1, MKTLIQR1 and FINR1AVG,
are signiﬁcantly negatively associated with the cost of equity. The coeﬃcient on the residual banking develop-
ment net of the eﬀect of accounting quality, CREDITR1, becomes signiﬁcantly negative. Models 5–8 indicate
that the residual stock market (banking) development measures net of the eﬀects of legal enforcement,
MKTCAPR2, MKTLIQR2 and FINR2AVG, (CREDITR2), remain signiﬁcantly (insigniﬁcantly) negatively
associated with the cost of equity. In short, our results are robust after controlling for the potential endogene-
ity of ﬁnancial development in relation to ﬁnancial reporting quality and legal enforcement strength.7.2. Alternative measures for ﬁnancial development
Following Brown et al. (2013), we alternatively measure stock market development as the ratio of total
market value of initial public oﬀerings in ﬁrms headquartered in each province to total provincial GDP at
the year end, denoted by MKTIPO. We also follow Brown et al. (2013) to gauge banking development by
the ratio of value-weighted aggregate debt to total assets for all listed ﬁrms in a province in a year, denoted
by CRTLIA. As shown in Table 10, our major results are robust to the use of these alternative measures for25 The non-state economy in China includes township and village enterprises, private ﬁrms, foreigner-invested ﬁrms and other non-state
owned ﬁrms.
26 La Porta et al. (1997) show that countries with poorer investor protection measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality
of law enforcement have smaller and narrower capital markets. La Porta et al. (1998) document that the concentration of ownership of
shares in the largest companies is negatively related with investor protections, implying that well-developed stock markets featured by
small, diversiﬁed shareholders are unlikely in countries that fail to protect their rights.
Table 9
Robustness check: endogeneity of ﬁnancial development, accounting quality and law enforcement and the relation between ﬁnancial development and the implied cost of equity capital
proxied by RGLS.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Intercept 8.529 (4.88)*** 8.602 (4.92)*** 8.806 (5.03)*** 8.643 (4.98)*** 8.682 (5.27)*** 8.705 (5.28)*** 8.700 (5.28)*** 8.757 (5.31)***
MKTCAPR1 0.121 (3.07)***
MKTLIQR1 0.028 (3.19)***
FINR1AVG 0.028 (2.32)**
CREDITR1 0.430 (1.72)*
MKTCAPR2 0.066 (1.81)*
MKTLIQR2 0.014 (1.80)*
FINR2AVG 0.024 (1.81)*
CREDITR2 0.018 (0.06)
EMGMT 0.111 (0.61) 0.119 (0.65) 0.169 (0.89) 0.107 (0.58)
LAW 0.098 (2.18)** 0.098 (2.17)** 0.098 (2.17)** 0.097 (2.15)**
SIZE 0.282 (2.08)** 0.291 (2.16)** 0.311 (2.34)** 0.293 (2.16)** 0.253 (1.89)* 0.254 (1.90)* 0.254 (1.90)* 0.257 (1.93)*
MB 0.341 (4.95)*** 0.342 (4.96)*** 0.343 (4.94)*** 0.343 (5.00)*** 0.336 (5.04)*** 0.337 (5.05)*** 0.336 (5.05)*** 0.338 (5.09)***
BETA 0.028 (0.12) 0.029 (0.12) 0.035 (0.15) 0.048 (0.21) 0.041 0.19 0.041 0.19 0.041 0.19 0.044 0.2
MOM 0.761 (5.68)*** 0.756 (5.62)*** 0.766 (5.62)*** 0.805 (5.87)*** 0.759 (5.53)*** 0.759 (5.48)*** 0.759 (5.48)*** 0.786 (5.73)***
ROE 1.301 (1.79)* 1.304 (1.80)* 1.298 (1.78)* 1.255 (1.72)* 1.385 (1.96)* 1.384 (1.95)* 1.385 (1.96)* 1.359 (1.92)*
LEV 2.412 (4.27)*** 2.414 (4.28)*** 2.426 (4.32)*** 2.424 (4.35)*** 2.574 (4.48)*** 2.577 (4.48)*** 2.577 (4.48)*** 2.591 (4.53)***
CPI 4.988 (0.92) 4.703 (0.86) 4.709 (0.90) 5.975 (1.12) 6.476 (1.32) 6.385 (1.30) 6.394 (1.30) 6.846 (1.35)
CROSSLIST 0.125 (0.42) 0.145 (0.48) 0.197 (0.64) 0.176 (0.59) 0.102 (0.37) 0.104 (0.38) 0.104 (0.38) 0.104 (0.38)
ACCT 1.650 (6.08)*** 1.558 (5.51)*** 1.710 (6.79)*** 1.885 (6.63)*** 1.778 (6.46)*** 1.74 (6.39)*** 1.744 (6.39)*** 1.896 (6.35)***
REFORM 4.693 (20.64)*** 4.668 (20.25)*** 4.624 (21.69)*** 4.724 (22.34)*** 4.591 (17.99)*** 4.577 (18.12)*** 4.579 (18.09)*** 4.604 (17.91)***
IND and YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 9752 9752 9752 9752 10,321 10,321 10,321 10,321
R-sqr 35.20% 35.12% 35.12% 35.15% 33.91% 33.90% 33.91% 33.89%
This table presents OLS estimation results for alternative ﬁnancial development measures and their relations with the implied cost of equity capital using Model (1):
CCit ¼ a0 þ a1FINit þ a2SIZEit þ a3MBit þ a4BETAit þ a6ROEit þ a7LEV it þ a8CPI þ a9CROSSLIST it þ a10ACCT it þ a11REFORMit þ atRtYEARt þ ajRjINDj þ eit ð1Þ
where the dependent variable CC refers to the implied cost of equity capital measure RGLS. In Models 1–4, FIN refers to the alternative ﬁnancial market development measures
MKTCAPR1, MKTLIQR1, FINR1AVG and CREDITR1 that orthogonalize MKTCAP, MKTLIQ, FINAVG and CREDIT against the provincial-level accounting quality measure
EMGMT. In Models 5–8, FIN refers to the alternative ﬁnancial market development measures MKTCAPR2, MKTLIQR2, FINR2AVG and CREDITR2 that orthogonalize
MKTCAP, MKTLIQ, FINAVG and CREDIT against the provincial-level law enforcement measure Law. Other variables are the same as in Table 2. Variable deﬁnitions are provided
in Appendix A. t-statistics are adjusted for ﬁrm-speciﬁc and year-speciﬁc clusters.
* Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Table 10
Robustness check: alternative measures for stock market development, banking development and their relations with the implied cost of equity capital proxied by RGLS.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Intercept 8.666 (5.11)*** 16.408 (2.51)*** 10.945 (6.61)*** 0.052 (2.63)*** 9.451 (5.76)*** 17.397 (2.71)*** 12.23 (6.20)*** 0.065 (4.02)***
MKTIPO 0.119 (2.76)*** 0.184 (2.16)** 0.339 (3.54)*** 0.003 (3.66)***
CRTLIA 3.887 (2.74)*** 0.865 (0.30) 0.283 (0.13) 0.018 (0.70)
SIZE 0.336 (2.48)*** 2.066 (2.48)*** 0.285 (1.32) 0.001 (0.29) 0.307 (2.37)** 2.321 (2.89)*** 0.149 (0.70) 0.001 (0.69)
MB 0.305 (4.81)*** 0.302 (1.97)** 0.386 (4.40)*** 0.004 (3.86)*** 0.339 (5.10)*** 0.294 (2.09)** 0.389 (4.68)*** 0.004 (4.37)***
BETA 0.166 (0.67) 1.268 (2.47)*** 0.669 (1.48) 0.009 (2.72)*** 0.035 (0.16) 1.328 (2.27)** 0.377 (0.70) 0.006 (1.33)
MOM 2.713 (4.48)*** 0.845 (1.12) 4.176 (6.69)*** 0.053 (5.22)*** 2.671 (4.63)*** 0.781 (0.91) 4.57 (8.34)*** 0.052 (8.75)***
ROE 1.746 (2.31)** 2.874 (2.32)** 1.461 (0.91) 0.014 (0.83) 1.353 (1.91)* 2.950 (2.49)*** 1.022 (0.88) 0.005 (0.45)
LEV 7.377 (1.58) 33.777 (1.46) 17.007 (1.77)* 0.221 (1.71)* 6.793 (1.27) 31.775 (1.33) 14.264 (1.72)* 0.184 (1.56)
CPI 0.712 (4.95)*** 2.667 (8.59)*** 0.875 (5.66)*** 0.012 (6.09)*** 0.785 (5.71)*** 2.831 (9.31)*** 0.976 (5.99)*** 0.012 (7.04)***
CROSSLIST 0.238 (0.79) 0.528 (1.05) 0.017 (0.04) 0.000 (0.06) 0.203 (0.71) 0.357 (0.62) 0.063 (0.13) 0.001 (0.21)
ACCT 2.108 (6.59)*** 10.881 (5.17)*** 2.924 (4.83)*** 0.032 (4.01)*** 1.862 (6.06)*** 10.747 (5.58)*** 2.948 (5.45)*** 0.031 (4.26)***
REFORM 4.634 (18.16)*** 20.06 (21.10)*** 3.142 (8.64)*** 0.071 (14.36)*** 4.54 (17.48)*** 20.111 (21.08)*** 3.037 (8.24)*** 0.068 (14.42)***
IND and YEAR dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 8,523 8,532 3,132 3,586 10,321 10,321 4,509 3,953
R-sqr 46.22% 31.66% 20.42% 23.77% 33.88% 48.57% 20.93% 23.57%
This table presents OLS regression results for the alternative measures for stock market development and banking development on the implied cost of equity capital using the following
Model (1):
CCit ¼ a0 þ a1FINit þ a2SIZEit þ a3MBit þ a4BETAit þ a5MOMit þ a6ROEit þ a7LEV it þ a8CPI þ a9CROSSLIST it þ a10ACCT it þ a11REFORMit þ atRtYEARt þ ajRjINDj þ eit ð1Þ
where CC refers to the implied cost of equity capital measures RGLS, RDIV, ROJN and RPEG, respectively, in Models 1–4 and Models 5–8. FIN refers to the alternative stock market
development measureMKTIPO and the alternative banking development measure CRTLIA. Other variables are the same as in Table 2. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix
A. t-statistics are adjusted for ﬁrm- and year-speciﬁc clusters.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 243–277 269stock market and banking development, MKTIPO and CRTLIA, respectively. That is, the stock market
(banking) development measure MKTIPO (CRTLIA) remains signiﬁcantly (weakly) negatively associated
with the implied cost of capital. In addition, we use an alternative measure of banking development, the ratio
of total banking deposits to total GDP in each province at the year end, and the results are qualitatively
unaltered.
7.3. Alternative measures for the implied cost of equity capital
As an additional robustness check, we use the average of the four cost of capital measures to re-estimate
Model (1), and the results do not qualitatively change. That is, the new average measure is still signiﬁcantly
negatively related with stock market development. In addition, we also use a modiﬁed PEG ratio, RPEGA, as
an alternative measure for the implied cost of equity:P t ¼ ðEPStþ2 þ Rpega  POUT tþ1  EPStþ1Þ=Rpega2 ð3Þ
where the variable deﬁnitions of EPS and POUT are the same as those used in calculating RPEG. Our baseline
results remain qualitatively unchanged when using RPEGA.
7.4. The impact of entering WTO
One concern is that overall economic development reduces the cost of equity and promotes ﬁnancial devel-
opment simultaneously, which may induce a spurious negative relation between ﬁnancial development and the
cost of equity. To examine whether the relation is robust to economic development, we consider the exogenous
shock ofWTO entrance. China’s entrance toWTO in 2002 initiates the era of rapid economic development that
has profound inﬂuence on the cost of equity. After entering theWTO, many ﬁnancial market reforms are imple-
mented in China, such as liberalizing interest rates, partially privatizing state-owned banks and the split-share
reform, all of which also bring about rapid economic development. We add a dummy for China’s entrance to
WTO in year 2002 to Model (1) and replicate the analyses in Tables 2 and 3. Untabulated results show that the
negative relation between ﬁnancial development and the cost of equity remains qualitatively unchanged, sug-
gesting that the relation is robust to the eﬀect of overall economic development.
8. Conclusion
This study examines the eﬀect of regional (province-level) ﬁnancial development on the cost of equity cap-
ital in China. We ﬁnd that stock market development reduces the cost of equity capital, supporting the argu-
ment that it plays an important role in liquidity provision, information asymmetry reduction, risk
diversiﬁcation and corporate governance, and reduces systematic macroeconomic uncertainty. We ﬁnd, how-
ever, that banking development only weakly decreases the cost of equity. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
view that pervasive state ownership in large banks and lack of banking competition constrain banking eﬃ-
ciency in China. The eﬀect of stock market development on lowering the cost of equity capital is weaker in
ﬁrms with high growth potential or intensive innovation activities and disappears in SOEs. Further analysis
reveals that the negative relation between stock market development and the cost of equity is more pro-
nounced in regions with low accounting quality, weak law enforcement and low stock market integration
as well as before the stock-split structure reform, implying that stock market development substitutes for other
institutional factors in lowering the cost of equity. The above ﬁndings are robust to the potential endogeneity
of ﬁnancial development to accounting and legal systems, alternative measures of ﬁnancial development and
the cost of equity, and economic development.
This study contributes to the literature on ﬁnancial development, institutional factors and the cost of equity
capital by documenting that ﬁnancial development is an independent institutional feature that substitutes for
other legal factors in lowering the cost of equity. We also extend the banking development literature by pro-
viding direct evidence that banking development featured by the lack of banking competition, marketization
and lending discrimination constrains the mitigating eﬀect of banking development on the cost of equity. Our
study also enriches the existing literature on ﬁnancial development and innovation by providing counter-
270 J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 243–277evidence that stock market development in China does not beneﬁt fast-growing and innovation-intensive
ﬁrms. Our results provide useful policy implications for ﬁnancial development in China and in other transi-
tional economies.
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Appendix A. Variable deﬁnitions
This table provides the deﬁnitions of the main test and control variables in this study. The accounting and
stock market data for these variables are retrieved from the CSMAR database. CPI data are provided by the
National Bureau of Statistics of China, risk-free rate data are collected from The People’s Bank of China, and
data on province-level institutional infrastructure (e.g., government intervention, banking and private eco-
nomic development, and law enforcement) are obtained from Fan et al. (2011).
Dependent variablesRGLS Proxy for the implied cost of capital and is calculated following the industry method in GLS
(2001). The valuation model isP t ¼ BV t þ
P11
i¼1
ROEtþiRGLS
ð1þRGLSÞi BV tþi1 þ
ðROEtþ12RGLS Þ
RGLS ð1þRGLS Þ11 BV tþ11where ROE is reported ROE for the ﬁrst future ﬁve years and is forecasted using a linear
interpolation to the industry median ROE of the past three years. We calculate BVt+i assuming
a ‘clean surplus relation’, that is, BV tþi ¼ BV tþi1 þ ROEtþi  BV tþi1  ð1 POUT itÞ, where
POUT it is the expected dividend payout ratio. Please refer to Appendix B for estimation detailsRDIV Proxy for the implied cost of capital and is calculated using the valuation model below,
following Botosan and Plumlee (2002):P t ¼
P4
i¼1
DPStþi
ð1þRDIV Þi þ
P tþ5
ð1þRDIV Þ5
where in the right-hand side, Pt+5 is the future ﬁfth year target price proxied by the realized
stock price. The future dividend per share DPStþi is set equal to future period EPS times the
industry median dividend payout ratio when missing. Please refer to Appendix B for estimation
detailsRPEG Proxy for the implied cost of capital and is estimated following Easton (2004) using the
valuation model below:P t ¼ ðEPStþ2  EPStþ1Þ=Rpeg2
where EPS is the one-year-ahead realized EPS as well as the two-year-ahead realized EPS to
derive a measure of abnormal earnings growth. Please refer to Appendix B for estimation
detailsROJN Proxy for implied cost of capital and is calculated following Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth
(2005) using the valuation model below:   .
P t ¼ FEPStþ1ROJN  GST þ ROJN 
DPStþ1
FEPStþ1
 GLT ðROJN  GLT Þ
where the asymptotic long-term growth rate GST is the short-term growth rate estimated as the
realized average earnings growth rate for the future ﬁve years. GLT imposes the assumption
that growth in abnormal EPS beyond year t + 1 equals the expected inﬂation rate that is
annualized CPI one-year-ahead collected from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The
future dividend per share DPStþ1 is set equal to future period EPS times the industry median
dividend payout ratio when missing. Please refer to Appendix B for estimation details
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MKTCAP Proxy for stock market development and is calculated as the ratio of stock market
capitalization of tradable shares at SHSE and SZSE to total GDP at year end for each province
or province-level municipalityMKTLIQ Proxy for stock market development and is calculated as the ratio of the total value of shares
traded in a year to total GDP at year end for each province or province-level municipalityFINAVG The average of the above two stock market development measuresMKTCAP andMKTLIQ at
year end for each province or province-level municipalityMKTIPO Proxy for stock market development and is calculated as the ratio of the total market value of
initial public oﬀerings in ﬁrms headquartered in each province and listed on SHSE and SZSE to
total GDP in each province at year end, following Brown et al. (2013)CREDIT Proxy for banking development and is calculated as the ratio of total bank loans to total GDP
at year end for each province or province-level municipalityCRTLIA Proxy for banking development and is calculated as the ratio of value-weighted total liabilities
to total assets for all listed ﬁrms in a province, following Brown et al. (2013)Control variables
SIZE Proxy for ﬁrm size and is measured as the natural logarithm of a ﬁrm’s market value of equity
at year end
BETA Proxy for market beta and is measured as the sensitivity of a ﬁrm’s return to value-weighted
market return calculated over the past three years
MB The ratio of market value to book value of equity at year end
MOM Proxy for return momentum and is measured as the accumulated monthly return from last
month to eleven months before
LEV Proxy for leverage ratio and is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets
ROE Proxy for proﬁtability and is measured as the ratio of net income to total book equity at the
start of a year
CPI Proxy for inﬂation rate and is measured as the one-year-ahead annualized monthly CPI for
each province in each year
ACCT Dummy for implementation of new ﬁnancial accounting standards in China starting from 2007
REFORM Dummy for the split-share structure reform in China implemented in 2005, and it is equal to
one for the period after the reform implementation in 2005, and zero otherwise
INDDUM Dummy for industry membership following the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) Industry Code (2001)
YDUM A year indicator that proxies for year-speciﬁc eﬀectsConditioning variablesPATENT Proxy for innovation intensity in a ﬁrm and is measured as the value of the total number of
patent applications to the number of researchers in a province that the ﬁrm is located (Value 24
in Fan et al., 2011). A higher value of PATENT indicates more intensive innovation activitiesBANKMPT Proxy for the degree of lack of province-level banking competition in China and is measured as
the percentile ranked value of negative one time the bank competition index (Value 17 in Fan
et al., 2011)BANKMKT Proxy for the degree of the lack of province-level banking marketization in China and is
calculated as the percentile ranked value of negative one time the bank marketization index
(Value 16 in Fan et al., 2011)BANKDST Proxy for the degree of the lack of province-level marketization in credit distribution in China
and is calculated as the percentile ranked value of negative one time the index for marketization
in credit distribution (Value 18 in Fan et al., 2011)
272 J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 243–277PRIVECON Proxy for the degree of underdevelopment of the non-state economy in a province in China and
is measured as the percentile ranked value of negative one time the index for development of the
private economy (Value 8 in Fan et al., 2011)PRIVEINT Proxy for the degree of underinvestment in the non-state economy in a province in China and is
measured as the percentile ranked value of negative one time the index for investment in the
non-state economy (Value 10 in Fan et al., 2011)PRIVESAL Proxy for the degree of the lack of sales from the non-state economy in a province in China and
is measured as the percentile ranked value of negative one time the index for development of the
non-state economy (Value 9 in Fan et al., 2011)EMGMT Proxy for province-level accounting quality measured by the ranking of the median of
performance-matched discretionary accruals for all ﬁrm-years within a province in a year. The
performance-matched discretionary accruals are estimated residuals from an extended Jones
(1991) model that adds earnings over total assets as an additional control, following the
intuition of Kothari et al. (2005). A higher value of EMGMT indicates lower accounting qualityLAW Proxy for legal enforcement for the lack of protection of shareholders’ rights and is measured as
negative one time the mean value of the density of lawyers in each province or province-level
municipality (Value 24 in Fan et al., 2011). A higher value of LAW indicates worse protection
of shareholders’ rightsMINTG Proxy for the degree of integration of the provincial stock market with the national market and
is set to one if the degree of market integration belongs to the lowest quartile in the sample. The
degree of market integration is calculated by extending Korajczyk and Viallet (1989) and
Levine and Zervos (1998)Appendix B. The implied cost of equity estimates
This appendix explains the estimation procedures for the implied cost of equity capital measures used in
this study: RGLS, RDIV, RPEG and ROJN. For these measures, the estimation methods and valuation models
are diﬀerent in their assumptions about forecasting horizons and the incorporation of growth, industry or
inﬂation eﬀects. For example, GLS (2001) imposes the assumption that ﬁrm ROE reverts to the industry level
ROE beyond the forecast horizon, whereas the PEG ratio method implicitly assumes zero growth of abnormal
earnings beyond the forecast horizon.
RGLS estimation: We estimate RGLS using the Ohlson’s (1995) residual income valuation model shown
below, following the ﬁnite-horizon industry method in GLS (2001):P t ¼ BV t þ
X11
i¼1
ROEtþi  RGLS
ð1þ RGLSÞi
BV tþi1 þ ðROEtþ12  RGLSÞ
RGLSð1þ RGLSÞ11
BV tþ11 ðb1Þwhere ROE is the reported earnings over book value of equity. Note that diﬀerent from GLS (2001), we use
realized earnings rather than the analyst earnings forecast due to data limitation. Earnings forecast data in
China are not publicly available until 2004. We also note that if reported ROE is greater (less) than expected
ROE, the RGLS estimation will be biased upward (downward). According to GLS (2001), we need ROE for 12
future years in Model (b1). We use ROE in the ﬁrst future ﬁve years if it is available and positive, with the
missing or negative values supplemented by a linear interpolation method following Chen et al. (2011a).
We then forecast future ROE for the remaining years using a linear interpolation to the industry median
ROE of the past three years. In addition, we assume that the book value of equity BV, earnings ROE and
dividends satisfy the clean surplus relation, that is, BV tþi ¼ BV tþi1 þ ROEtþi  BV tþi1  ð1 POUT itÞ, where
POUT it is the expected dividend payout ratio measured as the median payout ratio over the past three years.
We set POUT it equal to its industry median when missing.
RDIV estimation: We calculate RDIV using the dividend discount valuation model in Botosan and Plumlee
(2005) as expressed below:
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X4
i¼1
DPStþi
ð1þ RDIV Þi
þ P tþ5ð1þ RDIV Þ5
ðb2Þwhere ﬁscal year t is set to 0–5, and when ﬁscal year t is set to 0, P0 and P5 are the current and the future ﬁfth
year target prices proxied by realized stock price, respectively. For example, for RDIV of 2006, P0 and P5 refer
to the stock price in 2006 and in 2011, respectively. The future dividend per share DPStþi is set equal to future
earnings per share EPS times the dividend payout ratio, with the dividend payout ratio set to its industry med-
ian when missing.
RPEG estimation: We estimate RPEG following the Easton’s (2004) PEG ratio approach. The valuation
model isP t ¼ EPStþ2  EPStþ1
Rpeg2
ðb3Þwhere Pt is the stock price at the end of ﬁscal year t, and EPSt+1 and EPSt+2 are estimated as one-year- and
two-year-ahead realized EPS, respectively, following Chen et al. (2011a). Once again, we use realized earnings
because the analyst earnings forecast data in China are not publically available until year 2004.
ROJN estimation:We compute ROJN using the abnormal earnings growth valuation model of OJN (2005) as
follows:P t ¼ FEPStþ1ROJN
 
 GST þ ROJN  DPStþ1FEPStþ1  GLT
 
ðROJN  GLT Þ ðb4Þwhere short-term growth rate GST is estimated as the realized average earnings growth rate in the future ﬁve
years. Assuming that growth in abnormal EPS beyond year t + 1 equals to the expected inﬂation rate, we
measure the asymptotic long-term growth rate GLT as the one-year-ahead annualized CPI collected from
the National Bureau of Statistics of China. Note that GLT sets a lower bound to the ROJN estimates.
DPStþ1 is speciﬁed the same as for the above RDIV estimation.
Appendix C. Financial development in china by year and by province
This table reports the mean values of the stock market development measures MKTCAP and MKTLIQ,
their average FINAVG, and the banking development measure CREDIT, by year in Panel A and by province
in Panel B. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A.Year MKTCAP MKTLIQ FINAVG CREDITPanel A: Average ﬁnancial development over time
1998 0.098 0.421 0.260 1.039
1999 0.125 0.502 0.313 1.080
2000 0.213 0.824 0.518 1.048
2001 0.165 0.425 0.295 1.069
2002 0.130 0.300 0.215 1.143
2003 0.119 0.302 0.211 1.187
2004 0.088 0.319 0.204 1.114
2005 0.069 0.202 0.136 1.045
2006 0.141 0.505 0.323 1.041
2007 0.396 1.989 1.193 1.007
2008 0.196 1.062 0.629 0.982(continued on next page)
274 J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 243–277Appendix C (continued)Province MKTCAP MKTLIQ FINAVG CREDITPanel B: Financial development by province and province-level municipalityAnhui 0.078 0.394 0.236 0.822
Beijing 0.381 1.441 0.911 1.857
Chongqing 0.091 0.405 0.248 1.109
Fujian 0.083 0.359 0.221 0.748
Gansu 0.095 0.477 0.286 1.093
Guangdong 0.181 0.614 0.398 1.022
Guangxi 0.051 0.241 0.146 0.781
Guizhou 0.129 0.413 0.271 1.088
Hainan 0.313 1.467 0.890 1.141
Hebei 0.054 0.223 0.139 0.624
Heilongjiang 0.079 0.321 0.200 0.941
Henan 0.051 0.198 0.125 0.806
Hubei 0.119 0.514 0.317 0.930
Hunan 0.085 0.349 0.217 0.714
Jiangsu 0.062 0.256 0.159 0.798
Jiangxi 0.065 0.309 0.187 0.817
Jilin 0.134 0.587 0.360 1.146
Liaoning 0.105 0.428 0.266 1.073
Neimenggu 0.089 0.376 0.233 0.784
Ningxia 0.219 0.964 0.592 1.330
Qinghai 0.244 0.919 0.582 1.224
Shaanxi 0.078 0.342 0.210 1.148
Shandong 0.072 0.280 0.176 0.750
Shanghai 0.372 1.387 0.879 1.458
Shanxi 0.117 0.479 0.298 1.096
Sichuan 0.132 0.524 0.328 0.986
Tianjin 0.127 0.544 0.335 1.171
Xinjiang 0.149 0.641 0.395 0.983
Xizang 0.250 1.298 0.773 0.702
Yunnan 0.077 0.391 0.234 1.083
Zhejiang 0.067 0.302 0.184 1.104References
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